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Media Task Force of the Stability Pact for South East Europe

Ten Years of Media Support to the Balkans

An Assessment



Aaron Rhodes

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Preface

This Assessment of Ten Years of Media Assistance in the Balkans was commissioned by the Media Task Force of the Stability Pact for South East Europe. It was financed by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida, Sweden), the Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (IfA, Germany), and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Norway).

The report was organized by Press Now (the Netherlands). Researchers in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia contributed data about major media support projects, as well as local and international experts who served as interlocutors[1]. Aaron Rhodes[2] was engaged as lead researcher and traveled to each country to interview local and international experts.[3]

The report was developed from interview data, with reference to existing evaluations and other literature. A meta-analysis of 37 existing evaluations of media assistance projects in the Balkans was commissioned by the Media Task Force and Press Now and carried out by Roumen Yanovski.[4] His full report is available separately upon request; the conclusions are provided in the executive summary below.

This report does not enumerate, categorize, analyze, or evaluate all that has been done. That would be impossible in a brief report. Instead, the assessment presents the broad political and media effects of a ten-year period of intense engagement in media support by a wide range of actors.

Yasha Lange
Amsterdam, June 2007

1- A list of those interviewed is found in Appendix I.

2- Aaron Rhodes is executive director of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), based in Vienna, Austria.

3- Mr. Rhodes wishes to acknowledge the contributions and support of Lamija Muzurovic, Project Coordinator in the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF); Laure Almirac, who assisted in research as an intern at the IHF, as well as all those interviewed in the course of the research.

4- Roumen Yanovski is senior media researcher at the ACCESS Foundation in Sofia, Bulgaria

Executive Summary

From 1995 to 2005, the international community provided significant support to media in the Western Balkans. The Media Task Force of the Stability Pact for South East Europe commissioned this **Assessment of Ten Years of Media Assistance to South East Europe** to gauge the impact of past support and to provide recommendations (lessons learned) for future support to media.

Meta-analysis

Many specific media support projects have been evaluated previously. In building the foundation for this report a meta-analysis of 37 [5] existing evaluations was carried out by media researcher Roumen Yanovski. The text that follows summarizes his findings.

An analytical approach to these evaluations, strictly speaking, is not possible because of discrepancies regarding the geographic region covered, foci of the evaluations, time period covered, and fundamental terminological definitions. No reliable statistical information is available on media interventions, either for the region or on a country-by-country basis. Indeed, a general lack of data on media support exists.

Hence, the meta-analysis focused on common findings regarding media assistance to provide a critical summary of the conclusions of evaluations.

Most of the texts reviewed concluded that the impact of assistance to the media in the region has been substantial, as demonstrated by increased respect for human rights, the existence of independent media, the free flow of information, improved professional standards, and many other indexes. The analysis found that "almost all of the formal reports and assessments claim success, improvement, and progress."

Failure is rarely reported or framed in a "politically correct" language. Yet the assessments generally provide no substantive impact assessment, and thus claim success based mainly on activities completed ("output"). The rationale is that training was provided, therefore the project was successful. Evaluations employing more complex, expensive, and time-consuming impact assessment techniques, while more useful for distinguishing lessons for future projects, are exceptional.

The evaluations reviewed pointed to several main lessons or recommendations for successful approaches to media assistance:

Donor coordination is considered a ***conditio sine qua non*** of media aid, which also establishes a common ideal in difficult situations: increasing impact. Donor coordination provides synergy and cost-effectiveness, prevents duplication, and allows for a division of labor according to capacities. Donor coordination depends on agreement about strategies, transparency, and a willingness to cooperate.

Good ***local partners*** are seen as essential to understanding problems and implementing programs. Choosing effective partners is essential, but discrimination incurs inevitable costs. What is more, the criteria defining "good" are inevitably subjective.

Flexibility in project planning and design is important because of different environments and changes over time. Moreover, it presupposes that priorities and methods are not uniform and that choices and decisions remain open as social and political situations evolve.

The credibility of indigenous independent media must be protected by respecting editorial independence and ensuring that funding not be awarded on the basis of ideology.

The evaluations agreed on the importance of ***creating a culture of professional journalism,*** a "spiritual infrastructure" that builds and expresses high standards and practices and that offsets what some referred to as a "donor-oriented culture."

Developing capacity, not dependency is crucial because the two processes tend to be concomitant. The approach allows for sustainability. Emphasis is placed on local initiatives and refraining from imposing ideas, manipulations, and crippling bureaucratic demands.

Long-term donor commitment is necessary because media development is generally effective only after many years of sustained engagement; it cannot be known in advance how long will be needed to achieve results, nor what obstacles will appear.

Good strategy is necessary because media aid is in effect a form of "social engineering," requiring the application of acquired knowledge and careful planning. Strategy is most important in long-term media development efforts, rather than just providing emergency aid in times of conflict. Failures can be attributed to incorrect strategies or the lack of a strategy at all. Strategies are

5- See Appendix III for a list of evaluations reviewed.

sometimes based on models and generalities derived from past experience.

The evaluations address media development in key areas:

Direct support to media outlets is generally justified by state control over media and its potential for shaping opinion and knowledge. But evaluations reveal no clear lessons for selecting recipients. Donors have sought to support journalists' organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to avoid contradictions inherent in choosing recipients for direct support.

Legislative/regulatory framework - the achievement of a "stable, fair media-supportive environment of law, courts, and regulators" is a process requiring time, commitment by the domestic authorities, and technical expertise from abroad.

Training, one such key area, is often conflated with professionalism, although evidence from the evaluations does not necessarily show it results in professionalism. The need for training is considered self-evident, without need of justification, analysis, or assessment. It is too often viewed as a panacea. Training brings results only if targeted well, designed well, and provided under specific conditions.

Media institutes are mainly media training NGOs that can work long-term or function to support intense training in a transition period. Alternative training has often been seen as necessary in view of the inability of universities to provide media training, but evaluations are unclear about whether such institutes can exist supported by local funding as opposed to donor dependency.

Exit strategies have not been clearly defined. The shift from intervention strategies to achieve public policy goals to professional objectives and market sustainability, which intrinsically necessitate exit strategies, yet without clear impact assessment, leaves an impression of arbitrariness.

Evaluations have not sorted out how or the degree to which interventions have "distorted" the media scene, creating media (organizations) that cannot survive without donors. Many media organizations have been "artificially" created to try to achieve various public policy goals (non-market missions), yet, paradoxically, were later asked to become "sustainable."

Assessment

This report builds on the meta-analysis and provides a global perspective on the efficiency and results of media assistance in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia with respect to support for media outlets and for journalists, legislative reform, training and education, and support for media institutions over the past ten years.

The following is a summary of the findings:

Background: Media support as a central strategy of foreign assistance in the Western Balkans emerged in the context of decades of state and party control, which prevented the development of independent and professional media, and the emergence of nationalist regimes that ruthlessly used media to foster ethnic divisions and violence in the region, especially in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia.

The main **goals and objectives of media support** fall in two broad and interrelated categories. Support aimed at achieving **political and social objectives** sought to strengthen independent media to overcome state domination and allow citizens to develop and support alternatives to authoritarian regimes. International donors have engaged media strategies to protect the freedom of expression and media freedoms, to reinforce peace agreements and overcome ethnic divisions, to protect and empower minorities, and to promote democracy and European integration.



Support for **media-specific objectives** aimed to develop a free, diverse, and professional media landscape. Donors followed criteria that define professional and responsible media in the West, including, inter alia, objective news reporting, editorial neutrality and independence, accuracy and responsibility, and respect for diverse societies. Generally speaking, the effort to reach political and social objectives through media support gave way to supporting media-specific objectives as democratic regimes emerged after the wars, ethnic conflicts, and political crises that dominated the region in the 1990s.

Direct support for media and content: assisting specific media outlets and journalists to allow them to survive and function in the face of censorship and other extenuating circumstances, often took the form of emergency support, with few if any performance and reporting demands.

Direct and emergency support permitted operational **efficiencies**, but also incurred risks. Donor coordination contributed to the efficiency of direct support, but affected it adversely when it failed. While the main independent media were clearly in need of assistance, choices of recipients became more complex with the emergence of new projects.

BELGRADE : People take a look at the newpapers with former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic on the cover following his arrest 01 April 2001 in Belgrade. AFP

The **results** of direct media support can be seen in political changes that were able to occur when control of information and opinion by ruling parties was broken. As a result of media assistance, alternative political voices were heard and political competitiveness was achieved. Direct support to independent media was a key factor in helping the citizens of several Balkan countries rid themselves of authoritarian regimes. Independent media and journalists were given the means to remain engaged, and contributed to political and cultural diversity. But public broadcasting reforms are incomplete because of a lack of local political leverage to accompany donor assistance. Media projects aimed at broad socio-political goals have mitigated conflicts but have not achieved the most ambitious objectives, especially when imposed from outside.

While direct media support has achieved important political and media-specific goals, it has also incurred **social costs**. A residue of cynicism surrounds the reputation of media assistance, largely because of overtly political support and resentment about choices. Exaggerated expectations have arisen and been disappointed, especially about the duration of support and the ultimate responsibilities of local actors to achieve high media standards. Finally, alternative political media supported by donors have found that emerging media markets will not sustain them.

Support for **legislative and regulatory reform** aimed at providing a legal foundation for independent media and freedom of expression. The process was efficient and effective because Balkan governments and parliaments viewed it as a necessary step toward European integration, and because it involved little direct expenditure. In addition, in some cases civil society had a role in drafting and promoting legislation. But, although important problems such as hate speech have largely disappeared, **new media legislation has not been sufficiently well implemented** due mainly to a lack of political will. This has left gaps in regulation that have reduced the effectiveness of media assistance in some other areas.

The greatest share of media support was devoted to **training and education.** Efficiency was low when programs were poorly designed, if they did not reach managers and editors, or were too theoretical. Efforts to encourage journalists to take up political and social questions deemed important have had few lasting effects. At the same time, a substantial core of media personnel in the region has had exposure to training and education funded by the international community. Nevertheless, this training and education are not generally reflected in media quality because of market demand and the policies of owners and editors.

Support for **media institutions** has brought mixed results. **Media centers** have been effective as training institutions and resource centers, but have often proven expensive and dependent on donors. **Journalists' unions** have received substantial attention, but have not gained enough support to effectively enforce standards and protect journalists' rights. **Self-regulatory** institutions have had little impact. Some **media NGOs** have contributed to legislative reform and civil society media monitoring.

CONTENTS

Introduction

Donor Support

Governments, intergovernmental agencies, NGOS, and foundations have invested significant sums on projects to support independent media, like-minded journalists, production of content, reform of media legislation and regulatory agencies and state broadcasting, training and education, and media-related institutions in the Western Balkans from 1995 to 2005. Undeniably, for the first time in history, media support became a significant and even central strategy for the international community to address a range of political and social issues.

Support was made available by a wide range of actors. From private foundations (Open Society Institute, Knight Foundation, Westminster Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stifting, National Endowment for Democracy) to government agencies (USAID, European Commission, Ministries of Foreign Affairs from the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Germany, France, Finland, United Kingdom; as well as their embassies in the respective countries) to non-governmental agencies acting on behalf or with support of these ministries or agencies (for example, Swedish Helsinki Committee, IREX ProMedia, MedienHilfe, Norwegian Peoples Aid, Press Now, Deutsche Welle, IWPR).

The overall total of the funds made available cannot be determined exactly owing to a range of ambiguities: not all data are accessible or comparable, not all assistance was earmarked as "media support," few ministries have a complete overview of their media activities available, and the collection of data from all the individual implementers would be an impossibly laborious task.

Still, Roumen Yanovski has, with the assistance of the Media Task Force, made an attempt to collect and analyze the most readily available data on media support. The table below is illuminating, even though it **shows only recorded support.** The actual figure is therefore significantly higher, as this table lacks data from important private foundations and several governmental agencies.

It shows that most support was provided to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia, while the least media assistance activities took place in Albania. Training was the one most support isolated activity—and thus singled out in the analysis—while the remainder was given to direct support and media environment. [6]

The ensuing report first analyzes the overall objectives of these funds. What were the political/social and media-specific goals, and how are they related and combined (Chapter I). Next, four specific types of media support are analyzed and assessed for their efficiency and effectiveness over the past decade, considering the particular strengths and weaknesses of each. The four areas are: direct media support (Chapter II), legal and regulatory framework reform (Chapter III), support for training and education (Chapter IV), and the assistance provided to media institutions (Chapter V). The final chapter, VI, contains the conclusions for ten years of media support and provides recommendations for similar work in new regions in the future.

Table 1 -recorded support for media in the Balkans, 1996-2006 (X lmln Euro)

	Training	Direct support	Media environment	Total
Albania	6.9	1.8	1.9	10.6
Bosnia-Herzegovina	17.4	42	27.7	87.1
Croatia	2.4	19.7	14.5	36.6
Macedonia	3.4	9.2	11.2	23.8
Montenegro	1.3	2.9	3.4	7.6
Serbia	5.4	26.4	13.1	44.9
Kosovo	6.1	45.6	6.9	58.6
Balkans	42.9	147.6	78.7	269.2

6- "Training" includes funds spent for education and training: journalism training courses, seminars, and professional exchange of experience; for media training centers and university institutions, for technical training of personnel, for people sent for education abroad. "Direct support" includes a wide range of support for local media (from paying salaries to buying printing paper), launching new media, technical equipment (from computers to vans for distribution of print media), office rent, various materials, licences, etc. "Media Environment" includes funds for developing new media legislation and lobbying for it, for developing and sustaining self-regulation structures of various kinds (media councils and self-regulation bodies), as well as for journalism associations (trade unions), media networks (employers unions) and networking (e.g., exchange of radio and video materials among TV and radio stations on regular basis). Media monitoring and media research qualify as "Media Environment" also.

The role of the media in the Balkans is first described to contextualize the assessment.

The historical (ab)use of media in the Balkans

The engagement of media to achieve political and social objectives—broadly conceived—is not a new strategy. The totalitarian and authoritarian governments in the region and elsewhere have "supported" or intervened in the media relentlessly, instrumentalizing media to restrict and manipulate the flow of information and to propagandize populations. The Western Balkan context (excluding Albania) provides a unique embodiment of this model because the communist regime of Josip Broz Tito allowed for a certain amount of critical opinion to be expressed in public media. [7]

While there was no rich tradition of freedom of expression, media freedom, or independent journalism, the dissident movements in the relatively liberal Yugoslav communist political environment, being aware of developments in the Free World, were oriented toward the power and the potential of mass communication, toward media as a revolutionary vehicle for cultural innovation and political emancipation.

The decades preceding the death of Tito in 1988 and the period coinciding with the emergence of the post-Tito authoritarian regime led by Serb nationalist President Slobodan Milošević saw a growing preoccupation with mass media and its influence among public intellectuals in Western Europe and the United States that seeped through the relatively porous ideological borders of Yugoslavia. The weight given to media assistance in the Balkans ought to be seen in the context of a media boom in the West, when the "role of the media" increasingly aroused the interest, not only of the media itself, but also of international actors: governments, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and foundations.

Against this background, the spectacle of a militaristic European regime, ruthlessly exploiting the power of mass media to foment ethnic hatred and justify a brutal, ethnic war of aggression, inflamed the sensitivities of Western media elites, human rights activists, parliamentarians, and officials of foreign ministries.

Indeed, media became inextricably associated with the extreme political violence and turbulence that affected every society in the Western Balkans during the decade under study. Media were seen as central to the causes of these problems, and thus to their solutions: individual values, choice, and responsibility were increasingly linked to media inputs.

The civil populations in the region have themselves been preoccupied with the way in which the dramatic political events affecting the region have been conveyed in news and opinions expressed in the media, responding to what was until recently a thoroughly politicized media landscape. Citizens are only now emerging from a mind set in which it is assumed that clues about their fate at the hands of a non-transparent, totalitarian, and brutal state apparatus may be found in public media, and that media have no other than political purposes. It is possible to conclude that the wars in the Balkans were the first in which postwar media technology and techniques, especially television, were so egregiously manipulated, and that the projects to address deficits in democracy and civic responsibility, prejudice, and violations of human rights were the first to focus on positive media influence to counteract its misuse.

In **Serbia** the media was abused to make it a weapon for serving an aggressive ethnic nationalism. "Hate speech" entered the political vocabulary of Western analysts as a term to describe incitement to ethnic, racial, and political violence [8]. Serbian state media at various times mobilized the population in wars against Croatians, Bosniaks, and Kosovars, and unlike "the West," used sophisticated propaganda techniques to carry a tribal, nationalist message, crafted at times in cooperation with the Serbian Academy of Sciences. The confrontation reached its zenith in April 1999, when, during the campaign to force the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo, NATO warplanes bombed the headquarters and studios of Radio Televizija Srbije (RTS) in central Belgrade, killing 17 staff members.

7- Gredelj, Stjepan; "Sonu stranu ogledala: Istraživanje promene modela komunikacije u jugoslovenskom društvu na osnovu analize sadržaja pisanja listova "Borbe" i "Politike" u periodu od 1945-1975," Beograd, Istraživačko izdavacki centar SSO Srbije, 1986; translated as: "The Backside of the Mirror: Change of Communication Model in the Yugoslav Society, Based on the Articles Published in Dailies "Borba" and "Politika", 1945-1975," Belgrade, Serbian Research Center, 1986."

8- The major works on this subject include:
- Mark Thompson, "Forging War - The Media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina," Luton: University of Luton Press (1999),
- Bozic-Roberson, Agneza, "Words before the war: Milošević>s use of mass media band rhetoric to provoke ethnopolitical conflict in former Yugoslavia," in East European Quarterly 8(4).
- Hammond, Philip and Edward S. Herman (eds.). "Degraded capability: the media and the Kosovocrisis," London: Pluto Press, 2000.
- Kurspahić, Kemal, "Prime time crime: Balkan media in war and peace." Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003.
- Lyon, Philip W., "Words of war: journalism in the former Yugoslavia," in SAIS Review XXIII(2).
Milinkovic, Branko, "Hate speech: an analysis of the contents of domestic media in the first part of 1993," Belgrade: Center for Antiwar Action, 1994.
- Willcox, David, R., "Propaganda, the press and conflict: the Gulf War and Kosovo," London: Routledge, 2005.
- International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), "Hate Speech in the Balkans." 1998; the report is also available at http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc_summary.php?sec_id=58&d_id=2807.

NATO defended the strike as a legitimate effort to subdue war propaganda, affirming that media were being used as weapons.[9] A few days earlier, independent Serbian editor Slavko Čuruvija had been murdered, apparently for his support for air strikes against Serbia. The successful effort to oust President Milošević in elections in the fall of 2000, supported overtly by foreign governments and private sources, was a campaign that used media extensively, most notoriously the radio station B-92. Independent media again came under pressure in the State of Emergency in 2003, although not to the former degree.

While the media in **Croatia** had enjoyed several periods of relative liberalism, in the early 1990s the authoritarian regime of Franjo Tuđman sought to bring it under strict control, often with politically-motivated defamation suits, takeover attempts or efforts to obstruct publication through censorship. The nascent independent press largely overlapped in ideology and personnel with opposition groups, and the media scene, including such outlets as Feral Tribune and Radio 101, as well as propagandistic state media, was a main field of political battle. Media became the primary focus of efforts to free the country from the grip of Tuđman's nationalist HDZ party. Media support disintegrated with the ouster of the party in 2000.

The bloody three-way ethnic conflict in **Bosnia-Herzegovina** was strongly media-driven, both from sources inside the country and from Serbia and Croatia. The massive international effort to halt the conflict and rebuild the country as a multi-ethnic democracy following the Dayton Agreement in 1995 included projects to attempt to reconcile ethnic communities and break down entity borders via de-ethnicized national media. But media continued to play a negative role in the face of efforts to use it for lofty political and social goals, and journalists have been victims of political violence. For example, the editor of the largest independent Serb newspaper in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Željko Kopanja, was a victim of an assassination attempt in 1999; the attack is thought to have been prompted by the newspaper's documentation of atrocities against Muslims by Bosnian Serb authorities. As recently as September 2006, the media was accused of stirring ethnic antagonisms in the course of a national election campaign.

Media in **Montenegro** have reflected the fierce debate about the country's relationship to the power in Belgrade; an editor promoting unity with Serbia was even murdered.[10] Western governments strongly promoted independent media, but their support withered as soon as the campaign against the Milošević regime was successful; some media aid even encouraged support for his successor, reflecting unease in EU and US circles about an independent Montenegro, and some media support strategies changed again as Western governments soured on the new authorities in Belgrade.

Macedonia broke free of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 without a war. But an internal conflict about the status of its huge Albanian minority degenerated into armed conflict in 2001, which was ended by an internationally brokered Ohrid Agreement giving Albanians more political power. Media—both ethnic Macedonian and Albanian—inflamed the conflict, which in turn led to post-conflict media assistance strategies to heal the wounds. Media support surged with the onset of the open ethnic conflict.

Kosovo, formerly a semi-autonomous Serbian province that came under harsh Serbian dominion during the Milošević period, seems destined to become an independent nation having been an international protectorate since the NATO intervention. International engagement has taken the form of nation-building, including building media and its legislative environment consistent with a vision of a pluralist democracy conforming to European standards. It is generally agreed that no other part of Kosovo society has undergone as thorough a transformation as the media sector. At the same time, local donor-sponsored media inflamed animosities between Albanians and Serbs in the aftermath of the war.[11]

Albania has a different political history than that of the former Yugoslav republics. Having been ruled by the dictator Enver Hoxha for 46 years and in deep isolation from most of the world, the country had no independent media tradition. After independence it was governed by authoritarian regimes until 1997, and its political culture continues to contribute to instability and incivility. With little violence aside from a period of internal instability and strife, and no major threat of internal ethnic conflict, it attracted far less media support from abroad despite suffering from greater deficits than its Yugoslav neighbors in the public understanding of independent media and civil society, and media professionalism itself.

9- Numerous journalists and human rights defenders denounced the bombing as a breach of the European Human Rights Charter; for example, the Executive Director of Article XIX termed the attack "a repudiation of the values…democracies uphold and an abandonment of the many brave champions of free and independent media whose lives are…on the line in Serbia."
10- Duško Jovanović, the editor-in-chief and owner of the Dan daily, was murdered in May 2004.
11- OSCE Report, "The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo," at http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2004/04/2695_en.pdf quoted directly from the report, p. 15: While "it is generally accepted that media cannot generate sentiments or hostilities overnight, what they do is to strengthen existing or previously generated stereotypes and animosities. What the broadcasting media in Kosovo did, especially on 16 March, was to inject into a situation already dominated by fear, prejudice and uncertainty, emotional, unsubstantiated reporting about a tragic event involving innocent children, one-sided reporting about the unjust arrests of "liberators" by UNMIK and the blockade of the main roads of Kosovo by rebellious."

Chapter I.
Goals and Objectives of Media Support

In all the societies under consideration, the goals of media assistance reveal an interpenetration of political and "media-specific" objectives on the part of donors. It is a truism that editorially independent, public-service oriented, and responsible media cannot exist outside of a democratic political environment in which power is constrained by civil society, nor that media operating on those principles naturally move societies toward democracy and human rights protections—if they are allowed to do so. While a distinction between media development and media for development is apt, these objectives, insofar as they are separate at all, have deeply interpenetrating consequences.[12]

Here, these categories will be looked at individually and in relation to one another. They are evaluated on their feasibility, but also analyzed for how these are generally recognized in the individual projects, implicit or explicit.

The Broader Aims: changing society, influencing politics

Media support is—intrinsically—among the most politicized forms of foreign aid. Direct media support and support for content, the results of which are discussed in Chapter II below, have been aimed at political and social objectives in the context of the violent recent history of the Balkans. Political and social objectives have been expressed either directly or abstractly. Political change can result from assistance aimed at instilling intellectually and ethically sound media approaches and practices; it can be a consequence that is not explicitly articulated as a goal of assistance.

Most of the foreign ministries engaged in media support in the Balkans have seen it as a tool to achieve political objectives. The implementation of media support projects through government agencies or NGOs has involved an attenuation or modulation of these objectives, with strategies in which specific political objectives have morphed to more general ones or those pertaining to media professionalism. Implementing agencies have articulated the objectives of media support in nonpolitical and more media-oriented language.

Political goals have been most directly expressed in the cases of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia, where assistance to campaigning independent media was overtly aimed at enabling leadership changes through counterbalancing official media sources, with the intent of "creating a level playing field." The support to opposition media transparently committed to regime change has generally been couched in language about supporting "independent media," putatively committed to providing citizens with "the truth," that is, "to make people better informed about objective reality" as opposed to broadcasting or printing propaganda, and thus to offset state media influence. Supporting independent media has generally meant supporting media pluralism.

Another major political goal of media support has been to reinforce peace agreements and their political objectives, in particular the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia, or to progress further on the political projects begun by these treaties. In Bosnia-Herzegovina major media projects aimed at the political re-unification of the country by attempting to provide a common, de-ethnicized message and creating multi-ethnic media organizations and networks.

Specific political goals, rarely articulated by donors, have been expressed by and fused with a range of more general political objectives. Donors have cited the promotion of a range of human rights, and beyond that, of the freedom of expression as goals of their programs—rights which, when honored, allow for democratic change to occur. They have sought to promote political pluralism. In a prominent pattern of support, media and individual journalists seeking to promulgate political views deemed necessary to counterbalance those of dominant state-controlled outlets have been supported, even when the existing receptive audience for these media was miniscule. The goal of such assistance has been designated as promoting "pluralism" or "diversity" or promoting changes advocated by such media. Support for "independent" media and content has often meant support for the political goals of opposition groups, for example, support for the arrest of war criminals and the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It has also supported an ethos of tolerance and commitment to compromise and solving conflicts through dialogue and orderly political processes, as well as for critical positions vis-à-vis "war parties" and ethnic nationalism. Direct support has been given to document historical events that have been ignored or distorted by mainstream media, with the goal of undermining nationalist claims and helping citizens "face the past."

Donors have used media support as a means to give voice to and empower minorities, and to promote the rights of ethnic and religious minorities and interethnic harmony through

12- Ref. Remzi Lani, "Effects of Donor Funding upon NGOs and Implementers—How is Their Capacity Built or Undermined by the Actions of Donors," unpublished conference paper. The distinction is made between "Media Development" projects and "Media For Development."

the realization of legal minority rights and the integration of institutions; that is, to replace the negative power of hate speech with positive discourse. Support for dissemination of various types of political information has had as its goal increased political participation, more "rational" political behavior, and the relaxation of tensions associated with information deficits.

Donors have supported media in ways aimed at contributing to a process of democratization. Media support is also aimed at broad social goals, including increased international and specifically European integration and cooperation, peaceful conflict resolution, poverty reduction, promoting appreciation of the dignity of individuals, fighting corruption and organized crime, the realization of women's rights, and reducing ethnic distrust and prejudice. A wide variety of more specific socio-political objectives has inspired media support in the Balkans, including, for example, the promotion of Roma and other specific ethnic minorities, combating human trafficking, and environmental awareness. It would be difficult to find a single political or social goal of international donors in the Balkans that was approached without a media component, a situation leading non-media institutions to implement media projects.



Media-specific Goals: existential survival

The view that a strong media sector is intrinsic to the viability of any stable, market-oriented democracy is deeply engrained in all the donor communities that have assisted media in the Balkans. Media-specific goals have been comprehensive in scope, aimed at reform and modernization of media in societies that, because of the legacy of socialism and conflicts in the Balkans, had not yet benefited from transitions to democracy, free markets, and processes of European integration. "Professional" journalism and media management (both public and private) reflect experiences and also idealizations from donor societies: Journalists should have deeply rooted, clear ethical standards centering on independence, objectivity, accuracy, and responsibility to the public, including protection of citizens from negative national, ethnic, religious, or gender stereotypes. Media should have broad content that is relevant to the diverse interests and information needs of diverse populations—not be centered solely on politics; giving voice to minorities, and reinforcing positive common values. State-run public service media should be politically balanced, devoid of partisan content, and institutionally immune from the influence of ruling parties—it should be public service media. Media need to function in cooperation with one another, within societies and across borders, and they need associated technical capacities. Journalists' rights should be protected, and professional standards should be clearly explicated and self-regulated. Laws should protect the independence of the media, and civil society and the judicial system should ensure that such laws are implemented.

While goals concerning the internal dynamics of media outlets seem to have factored less in donor strategies, economic sustainability became a primary objective of support, particularly as aid programs evolved. Associated with this are the goals of sound business management and technological proficiency.

The media-specific goals of donors can be summarized as they are reflected by the main types of assistance considered in this study, goals centered on the perceived deficits in Balkan media.

First would be the existential survival of particular media via direct or emergency support (Chapter II), and the physical safety and continuity of the work of independent journalists (goals that have also had strongly political objectives). Political interference and subjugation, an undeveloped public sphere as a legacy of decades of socialism, and economic deprivation due to extremely weak market conditions brought on by war, conflict, and economic underdevelopment have all been severe obstacles for indigenous media development. Major parts of donor assistance to media in the Balkans have aimed at keeping particular media solvent and functioning, either in combination with revenue streams from sales and advertising or as a sole source of support. They have also aimed at keeping journalists working in their field, and not leaving the profession or even leaving their societies in times of crisis and threat. Some direct support was made to establish new media.

Media-specific goals are formed mainly around maintaining a distinction between facts and opinions and editorial independence, social responsibility, and intellectual and technical quality. At the same time, assistance programs have tried to raise and maintain standards cultivated by the journalistic profession. These standards apply to specific skills, techniques, intellectual values, and knowledge, and have been approached mainly via training and education.

Programs of training and education (Chapter IV) have to some extent aimed at the political and social objectives described above. For example, they have sought to engage journalists in specific social and political problems (reflecting donor priorities) and to give members of the media community the requisite knowledge and skills to pursue these topics, with the ultimate objective of changing or orienting public attitudes leading to political behavior. But the goals of training were much broader. Unlike some of the direct support provided, these goals reflect not only donor priorities, but

BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA, Tuzla : A Tuzla resident looks at a page in an early morning newspaper, 14 April 2000, showing the pictures of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and the top two Bosnian Serbs indicted for war crimes, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, headlined

also the conviction that the education and training of journalists contributes to more accurate and thorough reporting, and ultimately a more reliable and professional media sector. Such a media sector would foster a more informed public and a more vital democracy—illustrating the interpenetration of media-specific and political objectives. Training was a less politicized form of assistance than direct support; many journalists from outlets that would not receive direct support were also enrolled in training programs.

The support for media institutions (Chapter V) has been directed mainly toward media-specific goals, including professional accountability and self-regulation, legal protection and solidarity against political intrusions, cultivation and protection of standards within the media profession itself, improving working conditions for journalists, and support for associations of broadcasters and publishers to vitalize the sector by making possible advocacy for necessary reforms.

The Balancing Act of Strategies: methods and reality

In the course of the ten-year time frame of the study, and particularly in the conflict-torn parts of former Yugoslavia, most media support began as direct support for media outlets and for content, with more-or-less overtly political objectives. Such direct support was an integral part of interventionist political strategies in closed or semi-closed societies, characterized by oppressive state policies and conflict and political crises. Independent and opposition-oriented media suffered from censorship, fines and criminal charges, denial of newsprint, access to printing facilities, or other necessities; threats to media personnel and to potential advertisers in independent media, leading to economic failure, harassment and intimidation, and in some cases physical violence to journalists.

The media market in these situations was severely distorted by state influence. The first waves of media assistance, therefore, came in the form of ad hoc efforts to intervene on behalf of besieged independent or "like-minded" media competing against state-controlled or subsidized outlets. Assistance to Balkan media in 1995-2000 often took the form of emergency support with short-term objectives, and was thus not associated with the issue of longer-term sustainability and quality. Support was at times implemented not by media-assistance professionals but rather by political operatives or their representatives. Much of it had an ad hoc quality, given without conditions or expectations, and motivated by a sense of moral urgency.

Goals and methods shifted—sometimes efficiently, often too slowly—as political environments changed and the media themselves developed. The media support community itself underwent significant development: professionalization and routine procedures were implemented. Implementing agencies were increasingly asked by ministries to present results and thus justify their work after democratic changes in the Western Balkans reduced the sense of moral urgency. Donors became increasingly selective, skeptical, and demanding. Support took the form of restricted project funding conditional on the achievement of goals and objectives that were increasingly differentiated by implementing agencies.

As a new, post-conflict political status quo solidified in the region, media support broadly shifted away from political goals and toward an emphasis on the media-specific goals of professional quality and market sustainability. Donors became increasingly resistant to supporting individual media in an open media market, not wishing to "compete with the market." At the same time, donors began an exit process, a process that is still underway and which is often dominated by dilemmas about how to handle media that helped serve their political purposes but could not easily conform to the new challenges of post-conflict markets.

Chapter II.
Direct Support for Media and for Content

In this document "direct support" refers to funding given to specific media outlets and journalists to allow them to pay staff, purchase equipment, pay operating expenses, create and distribute media content, and develop their operations. The main characteristic defining this large category is that of targeting specific media, but the methods of direct support are diverse.

Direct support was, especially in the early phases of this ten-year period, often in the form of emergency support (described above), and was generally unrestricted, given without conditions to enable embattled media under threat to survive, to protect their editorial autonomy from state intrusions, and to sustain the work of independent journalists. Direct support also refers to loans for media initiatives. It includes donations of equipment and associated technical support aimed at media-specific goals of improving quality and sustainability.

In this chapter we will evaluate several aspects of direct support, starting with a description of the various ways direct support was implemented by different organizations and followed by an assessment of the ways coordination played a role in direct support. The last two sections of this chapter look at concrete results and the less direct effects of the direct support strategy.

Direct Support: risky but efficient

Direct media support in the early phases of the period tended to be rapid, non-bureaucratic, and in many cases spontaneous, given under crisis conditions. It was not usually part of a strategic program but reflected a situational ethic, political will, and personal sympathies. It was often covert and unregulated, without reference to clearly defined criteria and without transparent procedures, and in some cases bypassed laws and regulations that were at odds with international standards. Grants were made in cash, often by embassy personnel using year-end funds or NGOs operating with flexible funding.

Some new media projects were revealed to be inauthentic, and many of these errors might have been avoided if donors had had more local knowledge and had focused more on supporting existing projects.

Some direct grants were apparently symbolic in character, insufficient to provide the substantial help needed, which, while enabling small media to barely survive for a time, did not provide the means to reach a critical mass for success in the market. These inadequate grants accomplished little, and indeed harmed recipients with false hopes.

Donors with stronger local presences were able to identify serious partners, thus committing to uphold professional standards and sound management practices, but these two qualities rarely existed in the same clients. The courageous, ethically principled journalists and editors of the region almost never had management experience of the sort that donors often unrealistically expected, and some of them even disdained it.

Direct media support that had been undertaken using the most direct methods (that is, the least bureaucratic) led to losses and unintended consequences, but its operational efficiency must also be acknowledged. From the donor's point of view, the staff and operational costs of such support are relatively low. From the view of serious recipients, timeliness, lack of laborious procedures, and flexibility are crucial to making direct media grants efficient. This is true even in relatively stable situations, when both donors and grant applicants can benefit from streamlined procedures; yet the opposite tendency generally accompanies the development of donor procedures. The major success stories of media support in the Balkans, in particular, the cases where direct support has proved consequential in the struggle for free expression and political justice, and thus efficient in the most profound sense, have been when donors acted rapidly and with flexibility. In most of these examples, efficiency of support was possible because of the advice of local partners, whereas cases of waste were frequent when emergency decisions were made by insufficiently informed and non-acculturated personnel. The most direct forms of direct support were demonstrations of moral commitment that fostered positive political loyalties and reduced the risk of negative attitudes toward foreign engagement. From a long-term perspective, the legacy of positive attitudes toward European and American assistance led to a strong impact for direct media assistance that sustained journalists and media in times of peril.

A few symbolic instances of direct support show its strengths and weaknesses concretely.

For instance, the initial support for the independent Serbian Vreme newspaper was in the form of unrestricted cash contributions that allowed the owners to pay salaries. Neither the owners nor donors recorded the contributions, without which Vreme would have had to close operations in the mid 1990s. Once the future of the newspaper was more secure, support was given for specific projects.

Another example from Macedonia illustrates how the efficiency of direct support is affected by other factors: the Open Society Institute supported 15-20 embryonic television stations, based on the expectation that market competition would result in an efficient selection. Because of the failure to implement regulations, a media market did not materialize, while businesses and political figures assumed control and ensured the continuity of many of the supported media.

Supporting the maverick Feral Tribune in Croatia by paying government fines had the unintended consequence of adding to government coffers.

Coordination: cooperation and competition

As seen from previous evaluations, donor coordination contributed to the efficiency of direct support, and damaged it when such coordination was absent. Donor coordination among specialized media support agencies was good in most of the target countries. Agencies contributed to a process for sharing information, avoiding duplication, and achieving efficiencies through cooperation. Regular meetings, sometimes involving embassies, resulted in co-financing arrangements and achieving a division of labor.

There were notable failures of donor coordination as well. International agencies refused to share information about their projects, and differing political perspectives on media questions, particularly the role of public broadcasting, resulted in inefficiencies. Embassy personnel often provided direct support without consulting with other donors.

Coordination varied with each country. Emergency support was coordinated in Serbia, as donors agreed on which media were considered key to ensuring diversity. In contrast, donor support was not well coordinated in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with important exceptions; donors tended to compete, and lack of coordination resulted in support for the same project from different donors.

A fierce public debate among US and EU representatives in Kosovo about whether to support public or private broadcasting lasted two years and caused delays in media development. The result—a system with two private and one public country-wide TV channels—is a diverse field, not dissimilar to most European countries, yet one that is still dominated by donors whose political philosophies are reflected in editorial policies.

Investments in media have paid long-term dividends, not only in technical capacity, but also in the sustainability of independent media. This report has not focused in detail on the vast amount of technical equipment provided to Balkan media organizations, and indeed, when considering efficiency and effectiveness, these kinds of assistance are relatively straightforward. Investments (in cash or equipment) helped guarantee independence from state structures desiring to control media by limiting access to printing presses and newsprint, and by choking off advertising revenues. In some cases technical support for public broadcasters has been linked to reform of procedures and training programs aimed at achieving political neutrality and ethnic representation.[13] This holistic approach appears to have been efficient and effective in many instances. At the same time, "overcapitalization" has occurred in some contexts, a situation whereby recipients having received complex equipment cannot fund depreciation. Such programs need to capitalize for upgrades, preferably via loan programs.

Trends in developing the efficiency of direct support can be observed, which may yield lessons for future projects. The initial phases of emergency support reveal an environment in which choices about direct support were relatively clear for donors; "strategy" was relatively simple and clear, as indicated by other evaluations. Alternative media in the region had identified themselves on the basis of their own principles. A consensus among donors emerged with regard to the need to support independent media (e.g., Radio B92 and the newspaper Vreme in Serbia; Feral Tribune and Arzkin in Croatia; Monitor and Radio Antena M in Montenegro; Koha Ditore and Zeri in Kosovo; and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dani and Oslobodjenje). All except the latter were small, but provided political alternatives in state-dominated environments. There was a degree of operational efficiency from simple methods, and few initial questions about the integrity of choices.[14] Some conclusions about specific methods of direct support can be made. First, the situation changed as others entered the market, declaring themselves "independent" in order to attract contributions; choices became harder, requiring more sophisticated local knowledge, and efficiency diminished. Second, direct support had other unintended consequences, contributing, for example, to a plethora of media when regulations were not enforced. Third, a transition from unrestricted to project support weeded out bogus projects and improved accountability, but could be cumbersome. And fourth, packaging technical assistance, content assistance, and training emerged as a method to help ensure efficiency.

13- An example is OSCE and other support for MRTV in Macedonia.
14- Such questions did arise, however, as might be expected when media from different ethnic communities are supported in the aftermath of open conflicts among them; for example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, IREX was accused of "giving money to Chetniks."

The Results of Direct Support: survival of diversity

The dramatic and significant changes in government in the region have demonstrably reflected the influence of direct media support. Political-media strategies of donors have made it possible for alternative political sources to reach citizens. These provide information and opinions ignored or censored by state media and embolden citizens, on the basis of such media content, to hold ruling parties accountable, to insist on free and fair elections, and to reject manipulation of election results. Changes in political culture relevant to the long-term interest in democratization, pluralism, the rule of law, and civil society, and necessary to meet the criteria for European integration, are less evident. The claim that a large share of media support aimed primarily at specific, short-term political goals resulting in "a change of vocabulary but not grammar" is understandable, but must be seen in the context of the still-evolving political culture of the region. Without media support from the international community, it is likely that several Balkan countries would now be under the rule of dictators. Changes are not complete, but the environment has been opened up to allow more choices among political alternatives in the future. The following examples demonstrate this.

• Massive support for B-92, a Serbian radio station organized by a coalition of donors, and in cooperation with a formation of local stations (ANEM) was indispensable to the campaign to defeat President Milošević. The complex program of financial assistance and cooperation involved, inter alia, the establishment of an offshore foundation that re-broadcast via BBC satellites, and eventual installation of approximately 30 transmitters to broadcast into Serbia from adjacent states, the so-called "Pebble Project." Successful donor coordination, local initiatives and talent, collective confidence in recipients, and a willingness to take financial risks and bypass restrictive legislation contributed to the efficiency of the operation. Credited with such a large role in the election results, B92 earned a complex reputation as "pro-American" yet professional. Its entrepreneurial leaders have largely adapted to a post-conflict market situation, winning a frequency tender as a national TV broadcaster, and it continues to broadcast material aimed at political transformation (for example, programs about Serbia's past role in Balkan conflicts), as well as non-political content to ensure commercial solvency.

• The changes reflected the support of other projects as well. Press Now mediated financial support from various governments to pay for the newsprint for Serbian independent media when the Milosevic regime blocked local production: for more than six months the donors paid for all imports of newsprint into Serbia for the independent newspapers belonging to the Local Press network.

• Radio 101 in Croatia, originally a youth media under Tito, functioned as a "kindergarten for liberal journalists." Only the flexibility, speed, and local understanding of the Open Society Institute (OSI) saved the station from a hostile government takeover by privatization, accomplished in a few days at a reported cost of USD 240,000. The CCN TV network, also in Croatia, is credited with breaking the monopoly of the state broadcaster Hrvatska Radio Televizija (HRT) after an investment of around USD 2 million, most of which was in the form of a US-financed fiber optic network.

• ATV (Alternativna Televizia), supported by many donors for both operating costs and content, has transformed political discourse in the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was the first to air information about war crimes in Srebrenica, the violence against foreign consulates in Banja Luka in response to NATO bombing, and documentary evidence about obstacles to the return of refugees. Praised by the human rights community as politically nonaligned, it is viewed in many parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in parts of Croatia and Serbia. Its operational efficiency and sustainability are attributed to cooperative relationships with many other news media and civil society organizations, aside from its internationally recognized journalistic quality.

• Koha Ditore in Kosovo, supported by the OSI and other donors, was a voice for politically responsible calls for change during years of severe political oppression. It helped the international community understand the situation.

With international support, independent journalists and media have survived. Small independent publications that could not have existed without direct donor support carried a range of information and opinion to societies that were strongly influenced by state media. This enabled them to serve as incubators for a nascent civil society and alterative political culture in the region. Most of the main beneficiaries of strong direct support are now sustainable, without continuing assistance.

Other supported media in many cases did not survive in the formal sense, but their personnel have remained in the profession and gone on to make significant professional contributions to media that now exist in the mainstream of political and commercial life. Approximately 50 Croatian journalists and editors serve in mainstream media today, including editors of public television, who are alumni of alternative media. Arkzin, an anti-war Croatian paper that

ultimately failed despite international funding that amounted to over USD 9 per sold copy, nevertheless saved the nucleus of independent and free-thinking journalism in Croatia during the worst years of war, hate speech, and government control of the media. In Serbia many independent journalists formerly employed by Naša Borba, which was forced out of business as a victim of state censorship in 1998, have found professional roles in the new architecture of the Serbian media. Veterans of the independent media in Kosovo are now engaged in media in the new and enlarged scene; others are activists in political parties.

With international support, independent media have contributed to the emergence of more politically and culturally diverse societies.

• Issues such as the war crimes cases (according to a Croatian informant) only appeared in small, donor-assisted publications, for example, in Arzkin, the Feral Tribune, and Erasmus, But the modest exposure had far-reaching effects because, according to a local authority, the issues "were discussed and analyzed until they were impossible to neglect…eventually the mainstream media reacted," leading to the formation of a critical mass of public opinion. These journals provided a voice for a counterculture and minorities, apart from the "male, conservative norm." They emphasized pluralism and inclusiveness, a counterculture that still exists in the society today, with the emergence of an appreciative audience. Mainstream media have taken up these ideas and the journalists that focus on them, even though many of the media themselves have disappeared. Indeed, the effectiveness or results of media assistance cannot be accurately measured from the existence of the media outlets alone.



• Monitor, an independent political journal in Montenegro, began without donor support and was successful because its leaders did not form their project on the basis of the availability of funding, but rather on their own values and vision. Outside funding, however, encouraged the publication to broaden its approach and take up social problems beyond the need to change government, because, as a journalist reported, "We were not prepared to examine our own problems."

• "Heroes" and "Frankly Speaking," television programs in Albania developed with grants and offered free of charge, have strengthened an appreciation of individual dignity and the need for government accountability. The messages they have conveyed have successfully promoted ethical responsibility, tolerance, and the obligations of citizenship.

Numerous grants for content have sought to promote investigative journalism, a media practice essential to democracy and good governance. But the long-term results of many grants for content are not yet evident. Much investigative journalism stopped if it was not subsidized by grants. There are important exceptions, but typically support for methods and content have not resulted in continuing practices, mainly because of owner and editorial decisions and market realities.

Public broadcasting reforms, an important focus of direct media support, are incomplete. Support for the reform of public broadcasting, a major focus especially of the European Union, has been largely technical. But it has also included training and consulting to establish rules to shield public broadcasting from exploitation by governments and parties. However, strong political, cultural, and social obstacles to depoliticizing editorial practices continue to exist, including a deeply embedded tradition of state broadcasters taking editorial guidance from political authorities (perhaps a "fear of freedom"). The main effects are summarized per country in the following paragraphs:

Bosnia-Herzegovina, encumbered by a state structure aimed at stopping violence but unsuited to the demands of a developing society, has a public service TV that reflects the realities of post-Dayton. A complicated state structure emerged in which each entity has its own public service (but in fact, national) TV. The nationwide BH TV, covering the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, remains weak. Public media organizations in Serbia are widely accused of being politicized. It is led by figures from the Milošević government, revealing ideological bureaucratic intrigues and unfairly competing against private stations using donor funds. Despite these critiques, RTS has made substantial progress toward reform. Critics hold that public television is also "unreformed" in Albania; human rights communities recognize where political messages invade what should be neutral reporting. In small, clan-based, closely-knit societies where nepotism is common, donor teams working on organograms for the state broadcasters found they were designed to accommodate family structures. Radio Television Kosovo (RTK), the public broadcaster in Kosovo, was created ex nihilo with donor assistance and consultations, but breached responsible ethical procedures in fanning the flames of interethnic violence in March 2004. Mandatory programs of training for its staff (and those of other electronic media) were then imposed. Public broadcasting in Montenegro has responded well to support aimed at reform. Public television in Croatia is well-received by the public, and also popular elsewhere in the region as a reliable and high quality media source.

Many of the continuing challenges that face transforming state radio and television are structural: staffs are too large and consume funds that should be used to invest in programs and equipment. The political neutrality of public broadcasting is an ideal, rarely achieved anywhere. The standard by which

Balkan public broadcasting is measured—the BBC and public broadcasters in Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Spain, France, and other EU countries—is high. But obstacles that prevent attaining it are obdurate. Ultimately, these must be overcome by actors within the societies themselves. Programs to achieve truly public-service oriented public broadcasting have not reached donor goals, and donors have largely left the scene. A differentiated process of democratization can result from thorough reform of public broadcasting, but in most of the target countries, donor engagement did not have sufficient political leverage to reach expectations.

Media projects aimed at broad socio-political goals: cross-border confidence building, nation building, ethnic reconciliation, and promoting minority rights may have mitigated conflicts, but the most ambitious have failed when imposed from outside. At the beginning of the Balkan conflicts, media assistance campaigns saw a necessity to support or create messages that would cross national and ethnic boundaries, reducing the potential for conflict by counteracting national media. [15] The conflicts were regional, requiring regional strategies, including media strategies. In the early stages, news exchanges organized by the AIM network[16] and IWPR[17] worked along with sympathetic local media to form alternative news sources. A news exchange initiated by the Croatian CCN (see above) and supported by the contribution of a satellite uplink mechanism forged cooperation and content-sharing among Croatian, Bosnian, and Serbian partners in dealing with issues like the Hague War Crimes Tribunal that were typically subject to distortion by local media.

The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement[18] that ended military hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina left in place media structures that had carried messages mobilizing ethnic groups against one another. One of the most costly media projects in the region, the Open Broadcast Network (OBN), absorbing over USD 20 million, was an effort to create an independent broadcasting network at the state level, and thus to politically overcome the entity boundaries established by Dayton and promote the possibility for nationwide political messaging. It ended in failure.[19] A whole range of donors participated, including the United States government and the European Commission, the Open society Institute/Soros Foundation, Britain, Germany, Sweden, Japan, the Netherlands, Ireland and the Czech Republic. The failure is attributed not to the relevance of the concept, but rather to inefficient implementation, including a lack of local knowledge and need for short-term results that were cited as leading problems. The continuing effort toward nationwide public broadcasting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), has absorbed about € five million, but remains weak, a victim of the same ethnic divisions it seeks to overcome. Many local experts claim a better strategy would have been to reform and reconstruct the existing national television broadcaster.

In contrast, a less politicized project in Bosnia-Herzegovina, MREŽA Plus, succeeded indirectly in achieving some of the political objectives and many more media-specific ones to forge a cooperative media project bridging entities and helping to support local stations. Its success is attributed to its having been formed around well-established local media, confirming a general conclusion of previous evaluations about the effectiveness of "building from the bottom up."

Efforts to promote ethnic reconciliation via media projects have met with limited demonstrable success and have inspired cynical and exploitative reactions. Some stem from insufficient donor understanding of the 40-year history of such experiments in Yugoslavia, which made the slogan of "brotherhood and unity" a term of approbation and even ridicule. Improvements in inter-ethnic relations and integration have been credited not to donor-supported media projects, but rather to indigenous forces and processes. Around half of the grants for content in Macedonia have been aimed at this objective, and intolerant media reactions during ethnic tensions and clashes demonstrated their weak or nonexistent impact. Some projects founded to achieve harmony between ethnic groups have transformed into nationalist or politicized projects when media were sold to political parties.

Nonetheless, there are many examples of how direct media support for content, as well as for capacity building, has strengthened the positions of minorities at the local level and contributed to eradicating ethnic and racial incitement.

In Kosovo, for instance, the OSI, Press Now, the Swedish Helsinki Committee, and Swiss funders have supported Radio North Mitrovica, which has led to minority members being informed about important developments and a general relaxation of ethnic tensions. A Norwegian People's Aid-financed TV program in Croatia addressed the country's most explosive minority situation, the return of Serb refugees who had been driven out or fled the country during the 1995 "Operation Storm."

Significant portions of a new public in the Balkans can recognize and renounce hate speech as a result of the support for alternative media that has crossed national and ethnic boundaries, carrying a "voice of reason and peace." Overt ethno-nationalist propaganda has been reduced significantly and is no longer the norm in any of the societies in question. At the same time, in the view of prominent human rights defenders, the media market in multicultural societies remains ethnically divided.

15- Radio Boat (Radio Brod), a radio station that broadcast from international Adriatic Sea waters, was comprised of journalists from Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro.
16- Accuracy in Media (AIM) at http://www.aim.org/.
17- Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) at http://www.aim.org.
18- The General Framework Agreement (Dayton Peace Agreement) at http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380.
19- Medienhilfe Ex-Jugoslawien, The Fall of Open Broadcast Network, at http://archiv.medienhilfe.ch/News/2001/BiH-IWPR-OBNrep.htm;
Jankovic, Gordana, Media Donors – Partly Guilty, at http://www.b92.net/doc/media/media_donors.php;
Deluce, Daniel, Media Wars, at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2000/0003-03.htm.

(Side)-Effects: cynicism, divisions, and expectations

Overtly political media support has left a residue of cynicism about media support in general, which colors attitudes about the international community. A Croatian informant said, "We have been used to achieve political objectives [the overthrow of the HDZ party], and then abandoned. Assistance was not to promote democracy and values." In Montenegro journalists are skeptical that some donors who had promoted critical assessments of the Milošević regime beginning in 1997 with the government's political break with Serbia began exit strategies or withdrew when the regime was ousted in 2000; others began to encourage more positive coverage of Serbia (telling one newspaper, "Have eight pages on Serbia."). Overtly politicized media support has been seen as "fighting fire with fire," giving rise to perceptions that the international community ought rather to have worked harder to put out the fires of a politicized media. There is a perception that donors have been manipulated into supporting opposition groups under the banner of "independent" journalism, and that donors have been unprincipled and uncritical of critical voices. These reactions must be interpreted in the context of the legacy of communist politicization and manipulation of the media, and the specific Balkan sensitivity and ressentiment about interference from abroad.

There is widespread opinion in Balkan societies that media donors left too soon, revealing that their goals were purely political and that they were not committed to the long-term process of developing strong independent media and journalism standards. These feelings reflect the fact that objectives were not clearly enunciated and that donors expected recipients to take responsibility themselves to reach shared objectives. Exit strategies, if and when they existed, have often not been clearly communicated.

Choosing specific recipients, rather than funding institutions that served the media sector as a whole, left a certain ambivalence that can lead to continuing polarization and a process of reverse victimization. Media in Serbia, for example, which were ignored by donors because of their lack of critical political reporting and editorializing, now focus on the putative corruption and wastefulness of international actors: their assistance efforts are characterized as interference; their choices labeled as naïve. Some Balkan media, compliant with authorities in the past, have thus assumed a mantle of principled self-reliance and resistance to financial temptations from foreign donors that is a factor in preserving nationalist, anti-European attitudes. Media that have been supported by Western governments and foundations are held in low esteem by large, important parts of the market. Other evaluations have also recognized that the credibility of indigenous media must not be damaged in the process of supporting them. In some prominent cases, questions have arisen about the propriety of editors and owners assuming personal financial control of media that have, via direct donor support, grown massively in value.

A number of media projects, supported because they provided alternative political perspectives, found themselves confronted with demands to be sustainable in a market in which there was virtually no demand for them. Such media had been given what is considered "too much freedom," a possibility to generate content without reference to an audience. Their efforts, once praised and encouraged, were in the latter phases of donor engagement seen as impractical and reflecting a lack of market rationality. The Feral Tribune in Croatia, infamous for political satire and counter-cultural irreverence, has more recently been scrutinized for its deficits in management, market research, and planning capacities.

In the process of supporting them, media with politically attractive orientations were made economically dependent and have become disoriented when confronted by revised donor demands to achieve market sustainability. In some cases these have been unrealistic demands, given the miniscule and poor market for alternative media, demands requiring media to embrace commercial content at odds with values and tastes cultivated in a donor-dependent situation. Markets for elite political journals of opinion are small in any society, and will not support such media in most of them. Western donors seem to have assumed markets would sustain alternative political views, while they rarely do anywhere. Balkan societies still need alternative media, but they do not as yet, and perhaps will never have local sources of non-market support such as exist in other parts of Europe, the United States, and other developed democracies. But Balkan societies have developed in such ways that funds expended by international donors to support pluralism and independence from state control have contributed to a media explosion in the region. Former donor supported media, unable to survive in a normal market-oriented way, have had to find political and business-community patrons. As a result, journalistic communities that have moved toward European values and standards may lose sight of the ideal of an independent media, which is a primary objective of international support.

Serbia: Radio B92 - starting as a student radio, B92 developed into a successfull radio and TV station that played a central role in the campaign to defeat President Milosevic (everyculture.com)

Chapter III.
The Reform of Legal and Regulatory Frameworks

Media laws and regulatory frameworks[20] in every nation under study have been reformed. In some the process began prior to the decade covered by this study and continues at the time of this writing, as media-related legislation is debated and changed. Reforming legal and regulatory frameworks has been a priority particularly for intergovernmental organizations in their approach to assisting Balkan media. Governments and parliaments, and in some cases NGOs, have taken up the task in cooperation with international organizations and other donors. The Council of Europe, as the media standard-setting organization for Europe, contributed experts and advisors; OSCE missions and the Representative on Freedom of the Media engaged in advocacy and many forms of cooperation with governments, MPs, and NGOs; and the EU supported the process with funding and engagement by mission personnel. The Stability Pact Media Task Force prioritized media legislation and arranged significant multilateral support for projects to (re)draft broadcast laws, implement access to information laws, and reduce the impact of criminal defamation and high fines. Other donors have joined these efforts. As distinct from the kinds of direct support discussed in Chapter II, the forms of assistance affected the impact of legislation on media indirectly, and concerned governments, parliaments, and regulatory agencies.

In a formal sense the results have been salutary, if uneven. But the achievement of political and media goals as a result of a more conducive legal environment has been impeded by weak implementation in almost every country in the region. This will be discussed further below, after assessing the efficiency of the strategies used by international organizations.

Efficiency of Assistance

The process of assisting the passage of media legislation has been generally efficient because of the overarching incentive of European integration and its benefits, with the prospective reward of advancement on the road to EU membership acting as a strong lever. Prior to political changes in Croatia and Serbia, there was resistance to media legislative reform, and engagement was relatively unproductive. But after political changes, and as OSCE and EU structures moved on the scene, the passage of legislation that conforms to Council of Europe standards became a goal both of donors and recipient governments. There has thus been relatively little political resistance to the passage of media legislation promoted by the international community, which contributes to the efficiency of the process.

The process and its results have not been uniform, however. Efficiency in establishing legal and regulatory frameworks for media development has depended on prevailing political environments. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have been international protectorates for extended periods, and reform legislation has been introduced and passed

20- See Appendix III.

under particular conditions—in many cases, imposed.[21] More democratic environments have meant more complications in passing reforms. In some cases, reform legislation has not been ratified or has been weakened after initial positive changes. To the extent that a lack of political commitment to media reform continues to be a factor, the efficiency of the process may be further diminished.

Assistance to the process of legal and regulatory reform has involved little direct financial expenditure, although the international community has helped establish regulatory institutions with direct support and in some cases withdrawn such support when institutions have not met international standards.[22] The process has been driven by officials operating from within international organizations, primarily the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and has been most efficient when these institutions together maintained consistent positions and fidelity to standards, thus counteracting resistance that has taken the form of dividing and confusing the international community. These organizations and some governments have organized training programs, led advocacy campaigns, and engaged experts as consultants to review draft legislation, all at relatively low cost, and with few if any significant reports of waste. A couple of examples are:

- In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the High Representative created an independent body, the Communication Regulatory Authority (CRA), after which a law on public broadcasting was imposed in May 2002. The CRA awards broadcasting licenses, sets standards, and addresses violations when complaints are lodged. Statistics on breaches of rules indicate a growing level of compliance. Financing stabilized via revenue flows from licensing fees, making the CRA independent of political authorities.

- USAID reportedly spent less than USD 15,000 to assist in drafting legislation regulating Croatian electronic media. Internships have also been used to acquaint local officials with the way regulatory agencies like the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) operate, allowing the transfer of technical procedures and general principles.

- Drafting and advocating for the passage of the Macedonian broadcasting law required less than USD 40,000, mostly for travel and meeting.

There is a general perception that international assistance in the passage of media legislation has been more valuable than the costs to donors. There has also been negligence, causing international actors to miss opportunities to responsibly influence legislation.

In some cases, most notably in Montenegro and Macedonia, NGOs and media associations have been engaged to take part in the process of drafting and advocating for legislative changes at the grass roots level, a process that has contributed to efficiency in developing sound drafts and political acceptance, and in steps toward implementation. Laws thus reflect donor assistance to international NGOs such as Article XIX and local organizations, for example, the Union of Independent Electronic Media (UNEM) in Montenegro and the Media Development Center (MDC) in Macedonia. MDC, working with the support of IREX via the Stability Pact, German government funding through IFA, and the OSI, produced the first draft of the new broadcast law. It also lobbied elected officials and organized public debate.

Coordination among the engaged international institutions has been generally efficient, owing in significant part to a coordinating body soliciting and targeting voluntary contributions. But political conflicts among donors have caused significant delays. [23]

A good example of this was in Montenegro, where laws drafted by US legal experts contradicted regulatory principles promoted by the European Union. Another example was in Kosovo, where a prolonged philosophical and bureaucratic dispute about public broadcasting versus privately-controlled electronic media resulted in delays and the emergence of a compromise widely considered an inefficient use of donor resources.

Effectiveness of Reform

Donor assistance has been successful in providing models for media legislation and regulatory institutions; in helping local authorities shape laws and regulatory processes based on European and American practices; and in lending force to political processes.

International organizations lobbied against legislation that permits monopolistic tendencies, for example in Albania when, in 2004, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media successfully lobbied the speaker of the Assembly to postpone debate and allow for greater public input on a draft law on electronic media.

Strategies to achieve fundamental political and media-specific objectives via legislative and regulatory reforms, including freedom of expression and decriminalizing defamation, have also been largely successful.

Human rights organizations report that freedom of expression is rarely infringed upon in any of the countries under study.[24] Donors have contributed to this aim by protecting freedom of

21- In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, "all of the relevant legislation and regulation documents are adopted as a result of an overwhelming pressure from the Office of the High Representative (OHR)." ANEM and IREX, "Overview of Media Legislation in South Eastern Europe." Kosovo has operated under regulations decreed by a Temporary Media Commissioner.

22-The EU's EAR program withdrew funding for the Broadcasting Council of Serbia in 2003.

23- Stability Pact Media Task Force information.

24- According to the International Helsinki Federation of or Human Rights (IHF), no violations of freedom of expression were reported in Albania, Croatia, and Serbia in 2005, although some cases were still found in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro.

BELGRADE: A woman reads 06 June 1999 in Belgrade the Vreme daily newspaper displaying on the front page the headline «OVER». The title refers to Belgrade>s approval of the G8 peace plan for Kosovo. AFP

the media by monitoring trials and providing legal assistance to threatened media. Hate speech, as an open incitement to ethnic and racial violence, is rare, in part as a result of legislation outlawing incitement to ethnic and racial violence. Libel has been largely decriminalized, and some libel laws are relatively advanced compared to those in some other European countries. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, decriminalization was achieved by the direct action of the OHR and the efforts of civil society.

There have been generalized failures to implement new media legislation in the region, which reflect a lack of political commitment, weaknesses in the rule of law in all of the target countries ("There are many laws, but no law to obey laws."), as well as more specific weaknesses in the implementation of media laws that also characterize many developed democracies, where judges also often need training in the use of media laws. There are inefficiencies by regulatory agencies and mistakes by judicial authorities: "Laws are good, but not used." The plethora of media in the region can be attributed in part to failures to adequately enforce laws and regulations to "clear the market" (a failure that is seen as a strategy by political and economic players in most of the target countries). There exists a range of political and economic players who have an interest in seeing that media laws are not implemented: a diffuse, weak, and unregulated media sector serves political forces that need media manipulation to ensure they have a voice. Many business interests organize media solely for specific economic purposes.

Two laws that have failed to prove effective are: 1) the Broadcasting Law (2002) in Serbia, which brought order to the system, but where decisions have been deemed political, and implementing agencies do not enjoy trust in the media community; and 2) the Law on Access to Official Documents (2003) in Kosovo, which could have been an important tool for ensuring official accountability, but is hardly known or used. At a 2004 seminar for journalists in Kosovo, organized to encourage them to use the Law, it was stated that, "the Law alone is not sufficient; the journalists should still conduct legal battles in order to gain full freedom of information." [26]

Implementation: influence and responsibility

Failure to implement media laws has contributed to media assistance not fulfilling its potential. It is a challenge for government, parliaments, and civil society, and not the fault of international agencies that have helped introduce standards and promote legislation. Some observers conclude that international organizations that had been engaged in the process of passing new media legislation have subsequently lost interest, and have been reluctant to press for implementation.

Responsibility for the failure to implement media legislation that was developed, introduced, and passed with the encouragement and assistance of international donors should not be laid at the feet of those organizations. Foreign governments and international organizations are criticized for failing to press for implementation of legislation and for not emphasizing the role of civil society in monitoring and advocating assistance strategies, but several NGOs in the region have taken up this challenge with positive results, and without outside guidance.

Failure to implement reform legislation in all sectors is endemic in the new democracies of the Balkans, and reflects broad, profound, and obdurate problems. The passage of new media legislation is ahead of these nations' ability to implement and benefit from it, and brings into focus the continuing need to strengthen the surrounding web of institutions, practices, and attitudes necessary for the full exploitation of the benefits of free and independent media. The Rule of Law is still weak because courts are not independent, there is widespread corruption, and civil society is not yet strong enough to hold governments accountable. Training and the media institutions (discussed below) can help in the process of ensuring the effectiveness of recommended legislation, and its imposition by the international community.

25- For 2005, the IHF found no evidence of hate speech in the countries under study, except in Montenegro (page 372). See International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) "Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Europe, Central Asia and North America, Report 2006 (Events of 2005)" at http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc_summary.php?sec_id=3&d_id=4255.
26- ANEM and IREX, "Overview of Media Legislation in South Eastern Europe."

Chapter IV.
Support for Training and Education

Donors devoted the major share of media assistance in the Balkans to training and education (see table, p.13). This category of support includes a broad range of activities. General training provided to journalists in seminars was more common in the early stages; afterwards, more targeted training tailored to particular media, management, and transfer of specific substantive expertise was developed. The process has been inefficient and results ambivalent. There is a pervasive cynicism and negative assessment of the effectiveness of this chaotic process ("training fatigue"), and yet a rough consensus exists that the professional capacities of mainstream journalists have improved.

Training methods and strategies will be discussed in the first section; the effects of journalistic training in the Balkans will be addressed in the second section of this chapter.

Training Efficiency: targets and conduits

Too much funding, too little analysis and planning, and lack of attention to quality have resulted in waste. This form of donor engagement reveals a general absence of strategic refinement,[27] evaluation, and success in establishing value. As other evaluations have found, donors have often seen training as a sinecure—a politically uncomplicated form of assistance that would demonstrate commitment without raising questions or creating obligations. Some have embarked on training projects without adequate knowledge and analysis of the needs of target groups, and have often failed to work together with other donors to provide a rational and relevant set of opportunities. Implementing organizations, both foreign and domestic, have exploited the oversized donor market for media education, continuing to market training to donors on the basis of distorted evaluations of the needs of target groups, even as target groups have shown higher training levels and donors have planned exit strategies.

While journalists themselves have most often been the target of training seminars and other activities, editors, managers, and publishers have been less involved. The objectives of training and education have not been met, in part because those who have had access to training have not been able to put it to practical use. Publishers and editors tend to dictate decisions about content on political and economic grounds, and prevent specialized reporting on topics, often at odds with journalistic values transmitted in donor-organized training. Particularly in view of the exclusion of independent media professionals from many positions of responsibility in the past, "good political values do not go along with management skills." Journalists interested in cooperating with donors have often not had management responsibilities because of their politics; managers of donor-supported media were often journalists with no knack for business. Younger journalists have reportedly benefited most from training, while the professional habits of those in mid-career, which are generally already deeply engrained, have been less affected.

Donor assisted training largely focused on ethical and professional issues. Business management, however, was neglected, particularly in the early phases of support, and led to the failure of projects. Media were thus unprepared with appropriate business skills to meet the demand for sustainability. Moreover, there is a correlation between failed media projects and those whose recipients have had no management experience and/or training. Training in media business management—how to formulate a business plan, marketing, etc.—was needed by donor-supported media at the beginning so that they would have a chance to survive when donors left. And such training might have resulted in a more diverse media landscape than now exists, which has been a central goal of media assistance.

Donors brought journalism trainers to the region who had little understanding of local political nuances of media communities. Although some of their cosmopolitan members were far from ignorant about high professional standards and practices, they had only had opportunities to work in restrictive political environments. Foreign trainers assumed a lack of basic knowledge and often offended their students ("teaching fish how to swim"), contributing to the cynical practice by journalists of attending seminars in order to earn per diems, sometimes even feigning ignorance. Local expert trainers, those from other societies that faced similar transitions and who demonstrated a long-term commitment to the region, obtained the best results.

A coterie of repeat seminar-attendees developed, revealing a

27- See Tarik Jusić, "Towards Modern Education of Journalists in South East Europe," p. 8, in "Education of Journalists in Southeast Europe: A Step Closer to Professionalism," Tarik Jusić and Melisa Dedović (eds.), Media Online 2002.

tendency to invite "like-minded" journalists, ignoring others in need who may have been less likely to share donor political orientations.

Targeting training programs that can achieve results to the right audiences has often been lacking.

Training formats also affected efficiency. The standalone theoretical training seminar led by one or more foreign experts, with participants taking a relatively passive role, was inefficient as a format; its participants often absorbed little. Longer-term, "in-house" consultancy methods have resulted in positive changes and lasting transnational sympathies. In an optimum format, an outside expert with technical knowledge, seasoned professional judgment (including an understanding of the legacy of totalitarianism), and a practical outlook would work along with journalists on a range of concrete challenges and problems, without disrupting the flow of work. Training and education in the form of internships abroad has enriched the overall professional perspectives of many journalists, editors, and managers. But paying for individuals to go abroad is of course more costly than bringing in a trainer to meet a group. Some training programs have been hugely expensive for donors in the form of honoraria and per diems, such as those provided by BBC in Croatia.



Training linked to assistance for production projects, improved technology and its application, or other assistance have been efficient, as have training projects that have been designed by the media themselves.

Donors have faced dilemmas in finding institutions through which to provide training efficiently. They have often chosen to avoid partnering with university-based journalism programs in the region, and when they have tried it has rarely been effective. Journalism education in Balkan universities has been offered within various faculties in the humanities and social sciences in the state-run system. While the theoretical orientation of these degree programs is of little relevance to media in a democratic, developing, free-market environment, the universities have been slow to adapt. The institutions have still demonstrated vulnerability to political interference. Visiting journalism professors supported by donors have sometimes been shunned by university faculties, something that also happens in the West and only proves that universities, whether they be in developed democracies or in post-communist countries, are inherently conservative and often insular. As universities change to comply with EU models, there will be more prospects for flexibility. [28] In the meantime, a consensus emerged that there was a need for alternative forms of training and education.

Media training centers have appeared to fill this gap, and have been strongly supported by donors. In some cases (e.g., Serbia), too many of these institutions mushroomed on the media scene, and costs have been too high to provide good value for money. Media employers have not been quick to contribute to these institutions, which can potentially provide them with trained personnel while holding a key to their future as institutions. Indeed, the continuing engagement of international donors may have retarded a needed process by which local media should recognize their interest in and responsibility for training. Donors have faced difficulties in the necessary exit process.

Some donor funding has helped media training institutions morph to become accredited institutions awarding credentials deemed reliable by the media industry and supported by tuition. There is evidence that students self-select efficiently and learn more effectively when they pay for training and education.

Effects: "educationists" and ideology

Attempts to achieve political and social objectives via media training have had few lasting results. Donors have offered a wide range of training aimed to provide the requisite knowledge to allow journalists to focus on topics reflecting donors' political and social goals. These training programs are sometimes viewed as "inducements to take up sexy topics" (topics of interest to donors) that have often not had a lasting impact or built capacity in the long-term. Training and education have been used extensively to bridge ethnic communities, build confidence, and reduce ethnic conflicts. In Macedonia, for example, many training projects aimed at sensitizing ethnic Macedonian and Albanian journalists to the other community. But in Macedonia and elsewhere in the region, there is little evidence to prove that using educational techniques in the media sector to solve ethno-political conflicts has brought changes, nor can it be claimed that

28- The Bologna Declaration aims at the establishment of a European higher education area by harmonizing academic degree standards. See http://www.see-educoop.net/portal/id_bologna.htm or https://www.ilt.ac.uk/899.htm.

these efforts had no result. Many local informants among the opinion-generating public are highly skeptical, suggesting that those kinds of political-social goals are not achieved effectively using the techniques in the media sector that have emerged from Western "educationist" professionals. They are often seen as naïve, manipulative, and condescending.

Many training programs aimed to provide more and better investigative journalism, and were linked to the donor goals of greater transparency, more accountability, and ending political and economic corruption. Informants claim that the results reflect a lack of effectiveness, and that the rare good examples of investigative journalism in the region have generally not come about as a result of training. Nevertheless, there are important counterexamples.

Balkan media today reflect the results of donor assisted training, which has reached a substantial core of media personnel.

Training formats linked to concrete journalistic activity and production have been most successful. Two cases in point are Vreme and "Ideal Newspaper":

- In the in-house training program of Serbia's Vreme magazine, supported by IREX, students are invited to work at the magazine, receive mentoring by experienced staff, and often their work results in the publication of articles. Many of these students have joined the permanent staff.

- "Ideal Newspaper," a training project by the Albanian Media Institute supported by the Danish School of Journalism, was successful because of its "learning by doing" methodology, and this resulted in Albanian newspapers adopting the use of supplements.

Media quality often does not reflect the standards that could be upheld by journalists, standards that have been positively affected by exposure to training. Training has not solved serious "ideological issues" that continue to retard development toward operational standards and practices comparable with Western Europe. Media retain a highly hierarchical and autocratic management style, with important decisions made by editors to please owners and publishers, who are often powerful political and business figures with more than media-centered agendas. Generally, trained journalists cannot put what they have learned—particularly about topics that are important to the public, and which can help media become "public service" oriented—in practice. Observers report that "editors do not like trained journalists." The stories about human rights, minorities, consumer awareness, and corruption that may result from donor-financed training are often killed by editors and disallowed by owners and publishers. There has been an influx into the profession of dilettante journalists who have responded to the demand created by a media explosion, many of whom have not even attended a university. Such journalists are often opportunistic and not committed to the profession; they tend not to challenge the system by confronting the structures that stand in the way of quality media. These problems are directly relevant to developments in the profession that may be addressed by assistance to media institutions (they are discussed in the following chapter).

Kosovo: A newspaper seller in Prishtina. In 1996 Koha Ditore set up the first independent newspaper distribution network in Yugoslavia, using second hand newspaper racks donated by Press Now – photo Steven Assies

Chapter V.
Support for Media Institutions

By media institutions we mean media centers that provide multi-functional support, research, training, and production facilities. They include journalist associations and unions, self-regulatory bodies, and NGOs that carry out media-oriented monitoring, research, advocacy, and training. The strategy to assist media by establishing, strengthening, or providing core and project support for such entities has been seen as an alternative to direct support, which avoids the problems and paradoxes of choosing among recipients and risking a distortion of market forces. This support is aimed at strengthening organizations that can positively affect the media as a whole. At the same time, media institutions have also been seen as a way to promote political and social goals, especially to foster inter-ethnic cooperation and prevent conflicts, and as institutions advocating political rights.

Since media institutions vary considerably in their tasks and organization, we classify them in four categories (media centers, journalist unions, self-regulation projects, and media NGOs). We assess each type and evaluate them separately.

Effective, Expensive Media Centers

Media centers have played a role in counterbalancing the political power of state-owned and run media by providing resources specifically for the independent media, but their programs, undertaken with donor support, are largely devoted to advancing media standards and the professional needs of the media community. They are intended to promote quality media through education and training and to assist the development of the independent media community by providing common technical and archival resources that may be shared (for example, public access internet, production studios, space for training and meetings, space for press conferences). Media centers organize and provide legal advice and defense services for journalists. In some cases they engage in commercial market research, and thus earn revenues. With international support, media centers in the region have joined together in a regional network.[29] Another regional formation seeks to link investigative journalists to share information regionally via the Internet. [30] Media centers can be important civil society structures that foster local and international cooperation, exchanges, and innovation, with ripple effects extending far beyond the media community.

In some cases media centers have absorbed huge amounts of donor support, but have been slow to seek and win commercial contracts. They have also competed with one another, diminishing their efficiency, particularly in environments where there has been weak donor coordination. Their record of becoming sustainable in the post-conflict situation is mixed. Media training institutes, responding to the availability of support for training described above, have tended to be amorphous and lacking in program definition.

Some media centers have adopted an entrepreneurial approach:

• The Media Center in Sarajevo, founded in 1995, developed into a leading center for research and education with 30 employees. Supported in the past by an array of donors, it is increasingly self-supporting, having implemented a strategic business plan; yet its existence is an important legacy of the support.

• In Albania, two potentially competing media centers merged, heading off a competition and enhancing the efficiency of donor support.

The Balkan experience suggests that media centers can be effective institutions, contributing broadly to sectoral transformation. The concept is of particular value in its flexibility to respond to the needs of the media community, and, in turn, to provide services to society, such as news archives and market research. When they have been imaginatively led and efficiently managed, media centers have stood out in the region as institutions that promote cooperation and provide for economies of scale for donors. But in general (and as other evaluations suggest), donor dependency remains an issue.

29- South-East European Network for the Professionalization of the Media (SEENPM) is a network supporting professional standards and contributing to mutual understanding and stability in the region.

30- NETNOVINAR has received direct support in the form of a decreasing grant over a period of years. It provides a secure online directory and discussion network among investigative journalists.

Divided, Poorly Supported Journalist Unions

Journalist organizations in the communist period were, like other party organizations, instruments of ideological control. In the new democracies of the Balkans, however, journalist unions should encourage and protect independent journalism by cultivating a professional ethos and solidarity strong enough to overcome not only state interference, but also centralistic, politicized, or even corrupt policies by owners and editors that are at variance with ethical and professional ideals. Such institutions should serve the development and maintenance of a professional identity and enforce fair labor practices. Journalist unions can provide donors with a means to strengthen development and enforcement of professional standards via codes of conduct. They should also defend the rights of journalists and provide legal assistance, safeguard and advocate for better working conditions, and negotiate labor contracts.

The international community has put considerable effort and resources in the development of journalists unions, but the results do not reflect these efforts. Unions have by-and-large not fulfilled their potential in meeting these challenges. Unions in the region do not have enough members to generate income and political and professional leverage, and management has not been effective. Unions have not found much support from the international community or from journalists. In most of the countries under consideration, vestigial unions from the communist era have continued to exist, even though new unions have been formed as alternatives. While the old unions remain tarnished by their former ideological identities and archaic methods, new unions have largely failed to attract large numbers of members because they provide few services and lack credibility with media owners as enforcers of labor and legal standards. There has been a failure to consolidate, leading to a situation of multiple unions (for example, there were six in Bosnia-Herzegovina). This failure to consolidate, which is driven by continuing ideological polarization, acts as an obstacle to efficient donor support, or any donor support at all.

Donor support for unions has also been inefficient when it has been in the form of project support, rather than as operating support. Journalist unions should exist as structures to bind together the professional community: to provide forums for communication, exchange, and the development of personal and professional relationships; to allow for the professional community to democratically identify leaders, issues, and programs; to provide a face for the profession to the public; and most important, to support and defend the members. Such organizations are by nature established to efficiently perform core functions, rather than to undertake projects aimed at achieving specific goals. Their autonomy and self-governing nature is essential if they are to have credibility with their members and provide the opportunity for internal decision-making processes by which the community can develop.

A key member of the Albanian media community noted that, "You cannot have independent journalism without unions that protect journalists' rights and affirm their obligations." At the same time, journalists tend to be strong personalities who need strong forces to unite them. Below are a few examples from ten years of media support:

- The Union of Albanian Journalists was formed in 2005, with the support of IREX, in the wake of previous failures to form effective unions. The union has drafted a working contract for journalists and opened discussions within the journalistic community about it.

- Croatia boasts the most effective journalists' union in the region, which, in the absence of a media center, fulfills many of the same functions. The journalists' association, which has been supported by many donors, is a multi-faceted institution that inter alia maintains a pension fund. With financial possibilities connected to ownership of its premises, it has been able to develop and implement projects similar to a media center.

- In Macedonia efforts to organize a functioning journalists' union have been frustrated. One such institution reportedly lacks USD 40,000 per year to supplement fees. The fragmented journalist community has not come together around one union, nor is any union strong enough to bring them together. Indeed, the centrifugal forces are gathering strength, including around issues such as "corruption in the media," proving the need for such an institution while preventing its success. This is a situation that is an opportunity for donors to intervene.

Low-impact Self-regulation Projects

Experience in many European countries has shown that self-regulatory bodies allow media to hold themselves accountable and meet public concerns, reducing the rationale for restrictive laws that can violate press freedoms. Self-regulatory bodies can only function with the cooperation of the public and the media.

Self-regulatory bodies have hardly developed in the region, and have not had significant impact on the media:

- In Bosnia-Herzegovina a single code of media ethics was agreed upon, and three ethnically-based press associations were merged. The Press Council aimed to oversee implementation of a code of ethics, but has not found a way to exist without donors. The media outlets have not seen that reduced litigation costs would be

31- 160 cases were handled, and 60 were adjudicated from 2001 to 2006, according to its official reports.
32- See Self-financing of the Press Council in Bosnia-Herzegovina, USAID March 2005.

a reason to support such an association as an efficient investment. Management inefficiency and meager initial results disappointed donors.[31] The media industry has neither supported it financially, nor with cooperation that would deliver results. [32]

• In Serbia the Press Council translated a CODEX into minority languages, but it is a weak factor in the environment.

• Macedonia and Montenegro have no properly working self-regulatory bodies.

• The fledgling Press Council of Kosovo has 14 members, including the main print media. Operating on the basis of a code of conduct set forth by the international community, it reviewed 20 cases and adjudicated 15 in one year. A substantial gap exists between its small operating costs (about €40,000) and what is paid in fees by daily and monthly media.

The Role of Media NGOs

Media NGOs have not focused on advocacy to the degree that they must if they are to be effective in helping to implement legislation and promote professional and responsible media. Media NGOs are the part of civil society that must help ensure that parliaments do not breach laws and that state authorities are monitored, exposed, and counseled to do their jobs with respect to media regulations. But there are few media projects providing advocacy training in a practical, efficient way:

• The Media Council of the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (HHO) has been an active and independent monitoring operation supported by grants to the Committee. It has alerted society and the international community to cases of hate speech. Embedding a media watch unit within a more generalized human rights organization monitoring such issues as minority rights and the independence of the judiciary, the Council has used an effective strategy to impact on media. It does not operate in isolation, but rather in a broad inter-sectoral context.

• The Media Development Center in Macedonia has been an active partner in legislative reform, as has UNEM in Montenegro.

Media institutions, aside from unions, are rarely "sustainable" in any society. The NGOs and research institutes that help maintain media standards in the developed democracies of the West are often supported by foundations and other non-commercial institutions, not just the members or the media themselves. The donor community may be encouraging a commercialization of these institutions if it makes demands that are untenable under current conditions.

None of the media development goals of the international community for the Balkans can be achieved without the support of other sectors, sectors also in need of continuing engagement and support as they try to move toward harmony with European Union standards.

ALBANIA: A man holds a paper with a photograph of Albanian President Sali Berisha and signals his disapproval with a thumb-down during a demonstration in the center of Vlore, southern Albania, 16 February 1997. Some 3,000 people gathered to demand the reimbursement of their failed investments, and demanded President Sali Berisha's administration's resignation, as they blame it for collapse of a shaky financial scheme. (FILM) AFP PHOTO/ERIC CABANIS

Chapter VI.
Conclusions and Recommendations

This assessment has yielded a number of conclusions about the specific impact of media assistance in the Balkans, as well as recommendations for future media assistance engagement.

Political Objectives of Direct Support to Media

Direct support to independent media was a key factor in helping the citizens of several Balkan countries rid themselves of authoritarian ethno-nationalist regimes that were a malignant and destructive force at home and abroad.

Media assistance in the Balkans proved itself an effective way to promote democracy by removing barriers to the enjoyment of fundamental rights to information and expression as protected by international law, and without intervening in political choices themselves. When media support was perceived as being primarily driven by political objectives, it was in danger of being like the problem it sought to alleviate and obscuring the concept of independent media.

- Recommendation: The political objectives of media support should be framed in terms of efforts to realize human rights in accordance with international standards, to avoid actual or imputed politicization. The nonpartisan character of media support objectives should be emphasized. International donors will avoid the accusation of fostering regime change, if sponsored media offer balanced views.

- Recommendation: In transitional political situations, nonpartisan media are especially important for their ability to remain relevant as political environments change, when citizens need reliable and practical information. Donors should emphasize the "public service" function of media.

Media-specific Objectives of Direct Support

Donor support has broken the government and political party grip on media, but has also inadvertently contributed to an overabundance of media. There are too many print and electronic media in every country in the region, many of which have directly or indirectly been started or sustained by donor funding. This abundance of outlets can be addressed by implementing media laws to clear the market.

- Recommendation: By focusing direct support, donors should seek to avoid sustaining a large number of media outlets.

Thanks also to international assistance, technical quality is high, and there are forward-looking digitization and other programs. But donor support for high quality media has not had a wide "ripple effect" on the surrounding media environment. Most print media offer a sensationalist, tabloid approach. Quality in-depth and investigative reporting is rare.

Support has not affected the relatively weak position of journalists, nor has it significantly contributed to their level of education. Interventions by the international community have not greatly strengthened journalist unions, which would be the institutions that could bring order and quality to the profession.

International assistance has been essential to wresting control from states, but the results reflect the murky business environment of the region—such as a lack of transparency in ownership, political party positions in newspapers, hearsay about tabloids being controlled by security forces.

- Recommendation: Media support strategies should take into account the development of the wider media market and include strategies of market regulation and measures to strengthen the position of journalists vis-à-vis editors and owners.

Political bias is less visible in mainstream media, and is approaching a norm similar to that of Western Europe. Exposure to a more civil style of journalism—due to support provided—has counterbalanced the market and the forces of a deep-seated political culture. But protocol reporting is widespread, attacks against political figures are frequent and harsh, and fact-based reporting is omitted because of competition and lack of time. Support has created awareness about journalistic norms and ethics, but has not made applying these norms standard practice.

Efficiency and Effectiveness of Direct Support

Direct support has been most efficient and effective when given to ongoing projects led by those who have demonstrated competence and commitment. Failures of direct and emergency

YUGOSLAVIA : Staff of a local radio and television station sit at their equipment after Yugoslav authorities seized control of the independent station in the opposition-controlled town of Kraljevo, some 180 km south from Belgrade 18 March 2000. AFP

support have often occurred when support was given to new media projects devised to attract donor support.

The efficiency and effectiveness of direct support is enhanced by simple procedures, rapid action, and flexible approaches that allow for a margin of failure. High-profile failures have resulted when powerful foreign ministry and other officials intervene in project conceptualization and implementation.

Donor coordination contributed to the efficiency of direct support, and damaged it when it failed. Donor coordination among specialized media support agencies was good, as they shared information, avoided duplication, and achieved efficiencies through cooperation. Failures included lack of information sharing among international agencies, different perspectives about the role of public broadcasting, and embassy personnel acting without consultation with other donors.

- Recommendation: Donors should depend on media assistance professionals who are close to local societies, in order to emphasize the centrality of independent media values in politically sensitive situations.

- Recommendation: Media assistance strategies should provide core support whenever possible, allowing recipients to make editorial and content choices. In these ways support will help build strong media organizations and avoid wasting it on charlatans.

- Recommendation: Donor coordination schemes need to be built into media support at early stages, and should be a policy of international organizations. Direct support by embassy personnel should be controlled so that it does not contradict and undermine media support strategies.

Media support efforts aimed at "social engineering" in the form of nation building, confidence building, ethnic reconciliation, and minority rights have been less successful. Where societies have advanced in these areas, the forces of indigenous movements can be largely credited with changes.

Media support is most effective in contributing to building fundamental democratic values and practices when it concentrates on media standards rather than instrumentalizing media to take up socio-political issues and inter-ethnic approaches.

- Recommendation: Donors need to avoid instrumentalizing media and media personnel to promote values with funding. This brings activists and government agencies with diverse interests into media-support processes, which can contribute to decreasing respect for international donors and independent media alike.

Having said that, small-scale projects to reduce deficits in minority media and the exposure of minority positions in mainstream media have had a palpable effect on protecting minority rights and improving mutual respect. These projects have fared better than those aimed at remaking societies on an ideal of multi-ethnic tolerance in a region with a long, painful history with regard to questions of mutual

understanding, assimilation, and co-existence.

Direct media support has had unforeseen and unintended consequences in the Balkans, both in terms of media developments and for formations of attitudes about media support and the international community. Some negative consequences might be avoided in future engagements.

- Recommendation: Assistance should not be limited to the most clearly "like-minded" journalists and publications, creating dependent "donor babies" that will find themselves isolated under market conditions.

- Recommendation: Support for alternative political media should be accompanied by preparation for market competition

- Recommendation: Exit strategies should be carefully enunciated at the beginning of major donor engagements to emphasize limited objectives. Recipient communities need to be disabused of the expectation that the international community is responsible for, or capable of, transformations of political values that can only authentically emerge from sources within societies themselves.

Legal and Regulatory Framework

International donors have efficiently introduced and promoted media legislation conforming to European standards. Donor assistance has been successful in providing models for media legislation and regulatory institutions and in helping local authorities shape laws and regulatory processes based on European and American practices.

Coordination among the engaged international institutions has been generally efficient. The reform of the legal framework has been most effective when these institutions maintained consistent positions and fidelity to standards.

The assistance to the process of legal and regulatory reform has involved little direct financial expenditure.

While laws were passed, a failure to implement them has reduced the impact of direct support—since results depended on the development of a regulated media market. The plethora of media in the region can be attributed in part to failures to adequately enforce laws and regulations, leading to a diffused and weakened media landscape subject to manipulation.

- Recommendation: The potential for direct support to contribute to an oversized and unregulated media environment needs to be borne in mind in designing and implementing direct support strategies.

Implementation of the laws is, however, a challenge for government, parliaments, and civil society, and not the responsibility of international agencies that have helped introduce standards and promote legislation.

- Recommendation: The work of international organizations with regard to legislative reform is not completed with the passage and ratification of specific legislation. Projects are needed that can help NGOs work with lawyers, judges, media owners, editors, members of parliament, and officials to know, understand, use, and enforce laws.

In this regard media legislation is like that in other areas. The goals of media assistance will thus be more efficiently achieved when other sectors improve, most notably court systems, and when civil society advocacy groups focus on implementation lapses.

Training and Education

Training has been overemphasized by donors and often poorly implemented. Too much funding has led to waste. Donors have often seen training as an easy solution to a difficult problem, ignoring the structural reasons behind challenges faced by journalists.

Implementing organizations, both foreign and domestic, have exploited the oversized donor market for media education, continuing to market training programs to donors on the basis of distorted evaluations of the needs of target groups.

- Recommendation: Coordination among donors is needed to avoid a chaotic and contradictory range of too many options.

- Recommendation: Training needs to be based on a thorough and independently carried out needs assessment. To assure the interest of journalists, editors, and owners, a financial contribution should be required.

Training and education has been used extensively to try to bridge ethnic communities, build confidence, and reduce ethnic conflicts. However, there is little evidence to prove that using educational techniques in the media sector to solve ethno-political conflicts has brought changes.

The standalone theoretical training seminar was inefficient as a format. Foreign trainers assuming a lack of basic knowledge contributed to the cynical practice of attending seminars to earn per diems. Vocational training for young journalists did transfer skills, however. Longer-term, "in-house" consultancy methods have also left positive changes.

- Recommendation: In an optimum format, an outside expert with technical knowledge, seasoned professional judgment, and a practical outlook would work along with journalists and the editor / owner on a range of concrete challenges and problems, without disrupting the flow of work.

YUGOSLAVIA: Belgrade residents read bulletins and leaflets of the Serbian opposition coalition Alliance for Change 10 October 1999 in front of a central Belgrade shop window as anti-regime protesters gather nearby. AFP

• Recommendation: Ensure that training is practical, rather than theoretical, and is tied to assistance for content production or technical upgrading,

Those forms of training and education that have been effective often did not result in higher media quality because new skills could not be translated into practice. Some of the reasons for this were: obstruction by owners, limitations caused by editorial policies, labor market conditions for journalists, and the weakness or absence of media institutions.

• Recommendation: Editors and owners need to be engaged. A focus on business management needs to be in place, alongside professional and technical standards. Training strategies ought to avoid approximating indoctrination of donor preferences and be in line with market demands.

Donors have been successful in helping a number of important training institutions develop, including in media centers across the region. There are also improvements in formal journalism programs in higher education in universities, as well as separate programs that offer accredited Master's degrees. Ultimately, the future of these programs will depend on responsible media ownership and management, whereby media can contribute to the support of educational institutions.

Media Institutions

Media institutions should be the key factor in addressing remaining deficits in the implementation of media legislation, safeguarding media freedoms, and building integrity and professionalism.

Strong, independent journalist unions could contribute to raising standards and bringing discipline to the market. Strong, independent media monitoring institutions could help the public understand and reject poor media products, non-transparent ownership, and inspire owners and managers to provide high quality and more responsible journalism. Strong, market oriented vocational training centers could contribute to the quality of content by training professionals.

So far, however, these institutions have not contributed as much as they might. Journalist unions have not overcome divisions nor gained enough support to serve the profession. Self-regulatory bodies have hardly developed in the region, and have not significantly impacted the media. Media centers have been effective as training institutions, advocacy groups, and resource centers, but have often proven expensive, dependent on donors, and disconnected from the media industry. Moreover, they have not always met market demands.

• Recommendation: International donors should support media NGOs that monitor the media, protect press freedom, run advocacy campaigns, and promote implementation of media legislation.

• Recommendation: International agencies and foundations should offer consultation and advocate for strengthening journalist unions, but only when these unions can demonstrate significant membership, sound management, and vision.

• Media centers need to be efficient and market driven, cooperating closely with the industry they serve.

•Recommendation: The focus of international engagement in media development should be on the development of civil society institutions and on realistic models for sustaining them by the citizens and media themselves—by those who will benefit the most.

Appendices

Appendix I: Interviewees

Albania

Mr. Henri Cili - Faculty of Journalism, University of Tirana
Mr. Franko Egro - Director, Koha
Mr. Artes Butka, Mr. Carlo di Natale - European Commission
Mr. Capajev Gjokutaj - Open Society Institute
Mr. Andrea Stefani - IREX, USAID
Mr. Fabiola Haxhillari - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Mr. Armand Shkullaku - Editor in Chief, Klan TV
Mr. Alba Malltezi - Director, News 24
Mr. Remzi Lani, Ms. Diana Kalaja - Director, Albanian Media Institute

Bosnia and Hercegovina

Mr. Srdjan Dizdarević - Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ms. Samra Lučkin - BORAM Marketing/ Network
Ms. Dunja Mijatović - Communication Regulatory Agency
Mr. Darko Aleksić - Mreza Plus
Mr. Boro Kontić - Media Centre
Ms. Natalija Bratuljević - Swedish Helsinki Committee
Mr. Senad Pečanin - Weekly Dani
Ms. Darja Lebar - Office of the High Representative (OHR)
Ms. Borka Rudić - B-H Novinari (B-H Association of Journalists)
Mr. Zlatko Dizdarević - Former journalist, B-H Ambassador

Croatia

Mr. Srdjan Dvornik - Croatian Helsinki Committee
Mr. Saša Milosević - Open Society Institute (OSI)
Mr. Dražen Klarić - Chief editor of the first independent news in Croatia
Mr. Davor Glavaš, Ms Sanja Modric - Daily Jutarnji list
Ms. Suzana Jasic - HRT Council/GONG
Mr. Tin Gazivoda - Executive Committee member of the Croatian Helsinki Committee
Mr. Martin Mayer - European Commission (EC)

Kosovo

Mr. Andrew Clayton - IREX Kosovo
Ms. Lizabeta Paloka - OSCE
Mr. Migjen Kelmendi - Publisher, Java Magazine
Mr. Flaka Surroi - Director of Media Group
Mr. Kelmend Hapciu - Director of Kosova Live; Acting Director of Kosovo Media Institute
Ms. Aferdita Kelmendi - Director of RTV 21
Mr. Shkëlzen Maliqi - Media Analyst
Ms. Jelena Bjelica - Editor-in-chief, Gradjanski Glasnik)
Mr. Faik Ispahiu - Multiethnic media projects
Mr. Dukagjin Gorani - Kosovo Institute of Journalism and Communication (KIJAC)
Mr. Ibrahim Berisha - Dean of Faculty of Mass Communication
Mr. Gazmend Pula - Chair, Kosovo Helsinki Monitor

FYR Macedonia

Mr. Branko Gerovski - Editor-in-chief of Spic newspaper (founder of the first daily, Dnevnik)
Mr. Aleksandar Damovsk - Weekly Vreme
Mr. Robert Popovski - Secretary General of the Association of Journalists; Program director of Channel 5 TV

Mr. Gazmend Ajdini - IREX pro Media local representative
Ms. Vesna Sopar - Researcher at the Institute for Social and Legal Research
Ms. Biljana Petkovska - Macedonian Institute for Media
Ms. Mimoza Angelovska - Swiss Embassy, Assistant to the Ambassador, Swiss Development Cooperation
Ms. Sally Broughton - OSCE Media Development Unit
Mr. Nikola Mladenov - Owner of the weekly Fokus
Mr. Goran Gavrilov - Owner of the radio network Chanel 77
Mr. Robert Popovski - Macedonian Association of Journalists
Mr. Meto Jovanovski - Writer; Former Chairman of the Macedonian Helsinki Committee
Ms. Mirjana Najčevska - Former Chair of the Macedonian Helsinki Committee
Mr. Hristo Ivanovski - Editor, daily Dnevnik; Executive Committee member of the Macedonian Helsinki Committee
Mr. Borjan Jovanovski - Journalist, New Moment
Mr. Roberto Beličanec - Media Development Center

Montenegro

Ms. Milka Tadić - Weekly Monitor
Mr. Jaša Jovičević - New Agency MINA
Mr. Boris Ristović - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Mr. Miodrag Perović - Founder of weekly Monitor
Mr. Nino Radulović - MBC TV
Mr. Boris Darmanović - Association of Young Journalists
Ms. Claire O'Riordan - American ORT
Mr. Đuro Vučinić - NTV Montena
Mr. Vojislav Raonić - Montenegrin Media Institute

Serbia

Ms. Ivana Kahrmann, Mr. Emil Jeremić - Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
Mr. Aleksandar Đorđević - European Union Delegation
Ms. Zlata Kureš, Ms. Ksenija Prodanović, Mr. Dragan Janjić - BETA News agency
Ms. Milica Lucić-Čavić - Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe
Ms. Nada Josimović - Press Now, Program Coordinator
Ms. Mirjana Milošević - Institute of Social Science
Mr. Manojlo Vukotić; Mr. Dejan Gajić - Daily Večernje novosti
Ms. Ljiljana Smajlović - Daily Politika
Ms. Suzana Jovanić - Open Society Institute (OSI)
Mr. James Lyon - International Crisis Group (ICG)
Mr. Vojislav Milosević; Mr. Dragoljub Žarković - Weekly Vreme
Ms. Sonja Biserko - Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia

International experts

Mr. Peter Graves
Mr. Ivan Nikolchev - International Center for Journalists, Executive Vice President
Council of Europe, Media Division
Mr. Herman Baskaar - Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Press/Cultural Relations
Ms. Adrianne van Heteren - Jadid Media ltd. London, Director of Development
Mr. Rich McClear - IREX, Senior Media Advisor
Mr. Eric S. Johnson - Internews Network, Senior Advisor; Internews International, Executive Director
Ms. Nevenka Skopljanac - Medienhilfe, Program Director
Mr. Per Byrman - SIDA, Human Rights & Democracy SEE, MFA Sweden
Mr. Zoran Djukanović - Press Now, Program Coordinator
Ms. Albana Shala - Press Now, Program Coordinator
Mr. Steven Assies - Press Now, Program Coordinator
Ms. Luitgart Hammerer - Article 19
Mr. Hendrik Bussiek - Former IREX employee
Ms. Henriette Schroeder - Former OSCE Media Adviser
Ms. Marie Manson - Swedish Helsinki Committee, Project Coordinator

Appendix II: Overview of new media legislation in each country

Country	New Media Legislation[33]
Albania	Copyright Law (October 2003) Freedom of Information Act (June 1999) Law on Public and Private Radio and Television (1998)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Law on Public Broadcasting Service (September 2005) Rule on Media Concentration and Cross-Watershed Principle on Program in Relation to Broadcast Time (2004) Ownership over Electronic and Print Media (2004) Law on Public Broadcasting System (July 2004) Model Law on PBS (2004) Law on the Basis of Public Broadcasting System and on the Public Broadcasting Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Law on Radio-Television of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Law on Radio-Television of Republika Srpska (May 2002) Freedom of Access to Information Act (2001)
Croatia	Law on Media (new – 2004) Access to Information Law (2003 – annulled 2004) Law on Croatian Radio Television (2003) Law on Electronic Media (July 2003) Law on Media (2003) Law on Croatian Information and News Agency (2001)
Kosovo	Law on Copyright (September 2005) Law on Independent Media Commission and Broadcasting (July 2005) Law on Access to Official Documents (June 2003) Regulation no. 2000/36 on the licensing and regulation of the broadcast media in Kosovo (June 2000) Regulation no. 2000/37 on the code of conduct for the print media in Kosovo (June 2000)
Macedonia	Law on Broadcasting (new – October 2005) Law on Broadcasting (before 2003) Law on Telecommunications (before 2003 – under review since 2005)
Montenegro	Freedom of Access to Information Law (February 2004) Media Law (end of 2002) Broadcasting Law (end of 2002) Law on Transformation of State Television into a Public Service Television (end of 2002) Law on Public Information of the Republic of Montenegro (1998)
Serbia	Free Access to Information of Public Importance Law (November 2004) Serbian Broadcasting Law (July 2002, amended 2004 and 2005)

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Media Online, Overview of Media Legislation in South Eastern Europe, at http://www.mediaonline.ba/en/?ID=384;
Stability Pact, Media Task Force, Media Legislation in South Eastern Europe, at http://www.stabilitypact.org/media/default.asp.

Appendix III: Evaluations reviewed

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6. PRESS NOW, EVALUATION 2003-2005. Prepared by Peter Palmer, January 2006.

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STABILITY PACT
FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

Media Task Force of the Stability Pact for South East Europe

PRESS NOW
SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA

Media support as a central strategy of foreign assistance in the Western Balkans emerged in the context of decades of state and party control, which prevented the development of independent and professional media, and the emergence of nationalist regimes that ruthlessly used media to foster ethnic divisions and violence in the region, especially in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia.

From 1995 to 2005, the international community provided significant support to media in the Western Balkans. The Media Task Force of the Stability Pact for South East Europe commissioned this **Assessment of Ten Years of Media Assistance to South East Europe** to gauge the impact of past support and to provide recommendations (lessons learned) for future support to media.

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